


JPRS-EER-92-069

2 JUNE 1992



JPRS
JOINT
PROBLEMS
REPORTS
SERVICES

JPRS Report—

East Europe

East Europe

JPRS.EUR.V/1064

CONTENTS

2 June 1992

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- 4 Variants of Election Results Discussed *REPORTER* 11 Apr
Article Reviews Arms Deal With Libya *REPORTER* 13 May

HUNGARY

- Foreign Inmates of Detention Calling Voice Boxes *NEFESZABADISOK* 1 Apr
Hungarian Military Industry Called Somewhat *NEFESZABADISOK* 14 Apr
Tamas Szabo Bank Privatization To Continue *MARIBOR HIRNEWS* 17 Apr
State Audit Office Reports on State Debts *MFI* 1 Apr
Impact of Budget Deficit on Social Benefits *NEFESZABADISOK* 1 Apr
U.S. Cable Bid for Budapest TV News Fails *NEFESZABADISOK* 29 Apr
Problems of Agrarian Reform Viewed *FARM* 12 MAY 1991 29 Apr

POLAND

- Political Figures Evaluate Wałęsa Presidency *WIEZIENIE* 10 MAY 1991 11 Apr

ROMANIA

- 1st Campaign Trail With President Busca *ROMANIA LIBERĂ* 1 Mar
Aspects of Political Situation in City Discussed
PNTCD Extremist Poor *16 MAI* 1 Mar
How PRINR Won Majority *16 MAI* 1 Mar
Hungarian Schools Threatened *16 MAI* 1 Mar
Speech on CDU-DMR Relations *16 MAI* 1 Mar
Lineup of New Mureșana-Led Party Aired *BARD* 10 Mar
Ecology Party Dealings, Leadership Under Fire *BARD* 11 Mar
Treatment of Ethnic Germans Called Unjust *16 MAI* 12 Apr
Stănescu's Report on State of Economy Discussed *16 MAI* 1 Mar
Bank Keeps Les Dévaluations Under Control *16 MAI* 1 Mar

YUGOSLAVIA

- Alleged Greek Pogrom Against Macedonians *VOICE OF MACEDONIA* 11 May

4 Variants of Election Results Outlined

92CH0545-6 Prague REPORTER in Czech 15 Apr 92
pp 1-6

[Article by Martin Mirkov, "Will the Velvet Be Gone by June?"]

[Text] While in the corridors of political parties negotiations on postelection coalitions are coming to a head, increasing numbers of our citizens still do not know whom they will vote for two months from now. As the latest public opinion poll shows, more than one-fourth of the citizens of the Czech Republic remain undecided. But if we assume that our citizens are intelligent enough not to make their decision solely on the basis of preexisting sound bites, we can assume even today that from their ranks will come those who will either not take part in the elections or will vote for one of the parties in the center of the political spectrum. But whatever the results of their vote, there will obviously be no startlingly surprising outcome. Therefore even today knowledgeable observers are expecting at most four possible variants of the future political developments in our state. However, with one exception none of them is especially rosy. On the contrary. The outlook for our political scene is practically catastrophic.

The Optimistic Variant

Although the concepts of politician and opinion are to a considerable degree mutually exclusive, there still exist many of the former who believe that reason will prevail in Czechoslovakia. Not on the part of the voters—there it is taken for granted—but on the part of the political parties where it is in ever shorter supply. The optimistic variant expects that four large political groupings will emerge, which will begin to form prior to the elections and whose numbers will be increased by other parties after the elections. According to these views, a strong rightist and leftist bloc will be formed both in the Czech lands and in Slovakia.

For example, Fedor Gai thinks that the ODS [Civic Democratic Union] (Public Against Violence [VPN]), which according to the latest public opinion poll does not even have enough votes to be entitled to a seat in the parliament, will form a strong coalition with Černogorský's Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), the Democratic Party, the Hungarian Civic Party and the Slovak offshoot of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS). This coalition, in his opinion, could get as many as 40 percent (*) of the votes. Facing it will be, according to the "first post-November critique," the Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), the Slovak National Party (SNS) and the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement (SKDM) with an equal number of votes. The balance will be held by the Party of Democratic Left (SDL), which might be willing, in order to preserve a single state with the Czech Republic, to vote occasionally in favor of the rightist and presidential government resulting from the elections.

Although Fedor Gai can be rightly suspected of distorting the reality a little bit, he is not the only one who does not consider HZDS victory in Slovakia to be a foregone conclusion. The cards could be considerably reshuffled particularly by the former East Slovak Army, where the situation is entirely different than in the more Prague-moderate Bratislava. It so happens that Komerčík has an obviously justified greater fear of the "Bratislava centrist" than of the "Prague centrist." All the more so because two foremost federal politicians (Václav Klaus and Vaclav Šašek) had from eastern Slovakia. It is after all no accident that the moderate politics of the Party of Democratic Left toward the federation seems prompted from the attitude of eastern Slovakia.

Besides the paradoxical victory of the Slovak right linked with the former communists in the ODS, the idea of the common state—the optimistic variant of the postelection development also contains a surprise in Bohemia and Moravia. According to the "first critique," the right will succeed just before the elections in negotiating the formation of a strong bloc which would join the ODS, other than with the Christian Democratic Party (KDS), Club of Nonaligned Activists (KAN), and the anticommunists, also with the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) and Czechoslovak People's Party—Christian Democratic Union (PSL-KDH). That way the right could face up to the equally strong coalition of the Social Democrats, the Liberal Social Union, and some of the Moravian parties. There would again be an approximately 40-percent stalemate on both sides, while the dark horse for the right would be the Civic Movement with 10 percent of the votes, and for the left the notorious strong Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM).

In the view of the optimists, the right in Slovakia and the Czech lands would be capable of agreement, which would preserve the common state on the one hand, and on the other would enable the economic reform to proceed the same way as now. A strong position of the left would in turn make possible qualified opposition to governmental programs. There is only one thing left to say: in order for an impartial observer to reach the same conclusion, his optimism would have to exceed all reasonable limits.

The Pessimistic Variant

Pessimism is considered to be realism in these parts. And the pessimistic variant of the postelection development is indeed based on reality. Not on ours, but on the Polish reality. The current Polish model, which strengthens the Czech right, is considered to be the logical outcome of the failed euphoria from the collapse of the totalitarian regime and a natural impact of economic difficulties common to all the countries of the former communist Bloc.

According to the pessimistic variant, ODS, ČNL, KDH and KAN will form a government coalition in the Czech lands, and the other rightist parties will not pass through

the electoral screen. The left will remain split and neither shall we find ODS at the center of the new political scene. In Slovakia the government will be formed by the victorious HZDS which will be willing to admit to power only SKDH and SNS. Neither ODS (NPV) nor any other rightist party will receive the necessary 4 percent of the votes at the elections so that the only opposition to the nationalist parties which are leftist anyway will be the SDP. The Hungarian Civic Party will consider itself lucky if the nationalists will not remain in the parliament.

The same groupings as in the republics will have a simple majority in the appropriate part of the Chamber of Nations or the Federal Assembly. The goals of both groups however will be diametrically opposite where the cornerstone will not be the state swap but the economic reform. Whereas the Czech right will hold its basic principles HZDS and SNS will not renounce their arguments which they also used during the negotiations in Milovice. At that time both parties however rejected the formulation of a uniform position in the entire territory as well as the state swap as well as the Czech side.

According to the pessimists after the elections this situation will lead either to protracted parliamentary disputes and crises of the Polish type which will make it impossible to elect a president form a minority government or adopt key laws or the state will break up immediately after the elections. The pessimists also have their assertions on the recent Meciar affair which will result in the effort of this politician to create a wild hog between himself and the Czech Republic making any agreement with the Czech political circles impossible. Moreover in their view it is beyond question that a federation whose individual components have a different political structure cannot exist.

After Slovakia breaks away whether communally or uncommunally the situation in the Czech lands will stabilize and to the east of the White Carpathian Mountains a leftist dictatorship with democratic elements will come into being, similar to Russia or Ukraine. In fact in that respect the pessimists who mainly had from the Czech lands talk like optimists. We shall get rid of the Slovaks and everything will be easier they say.

Unfortunate as we have learned from historians a single nation or ethnic group generally are not the source of difficulties and simple solutions generally do not achieve the goal. If the pessimistic variant comes to pass the Czech Republic would have so many problems that it would become less powerful than economically stronger neighbors. Provided of course that there would still be interested in it at all.

The Leftist Variant

According to the pessimistic pessimists who stand in the right end of the political spectrum and according to the optimistic optimists who are on the other side in the next elections the left will be victorious everywhere. In

Slovakia HZDS will not cover all the other parties with the exception of SDP while both parties will jointly form an authoritarian leftist government. In the Czech lands ODS will be unable to come to an agreement with the other rightist partners and with an illegal body check will be passed to the rear of the coalition of the Social Democrats, Liberal Social Union, and the silent partner the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM). Václav Klaus-Dubcek will become president. Václav Kramárek the prime minister of the federal government. An alternative would be Kramárek as president and Minář as the head of the CSEB government. Václav Klaus will begin to Hradec Králové to write his memoirs in this connection the Social Democrats are being suspended to this. But in a decisive situation they will not hesitate as they did not before the February punch of 1948. They will forget about old disputes and will begin to bring them to the constitution into the government.

The process of shock will manifest itself in a massive migration of the new entrepreneurial class abroad and the resulting wave of exodus to the rest of the nation will undermine the country's economy even more thoroughly than Kádárka's economic experiments. The IMF and the World Bank faced with the changes in the direction of the reforms will knock our stats and foreign capital will find more promising partners among the Hungarians and so on according to the right a surviving future exists as according to the left happy social communism where the mark will lose its Czechoslovak character to be sure but again as a foreign exchange position. The first unquestionable advantage of the leftist variant is the absolute preservation of the common state. The second support of agriculture which with the help of Slovakia - party will be pushed through from Bratislava to Prague - Šafařík who will thus fulfill the dreams of the refugee in political vacuum Captain Záh.

The Pragmatic Variant

We have recently published the pragmatic variants of postelectoral developments (REPORTER No. 10). Its basis for reasoning is the striking similarity in the style and method of the political work of the HZDS and ODS as well as the extent of pragmatism in both party chairmen.

As we wrote at that time Václav Klaus and Vladimír Mečiar were the only two politicians who performed perfectly what worries the voters of their countries the most. Whereas ODS understood that what the Czechs and Moravians long for most is to become equal with the West HZDS understood the problem of their Slovaks—they would like to become the equal of the Czechs. For the Czechs to get in step with the West means to realize the normative reform. For the Slovaks to get in step with Bohemia and Moravia leads toward strengthening their own statehood.

What we thought at that time has been since understandably complicated by the revelation of the Defense and Security Committee of the Slovensk National Council that the candidate for secret cooperation under the cover name "Doctor" was in reality Vaclav Meciar. With the passage of time, it is becoming more and more apparent that the real goal of the affair regardless of the truth of the charge, which I do not, in fact, doubt, was not to eliminate a serious adversary from the ranks of the opposition. Not even a very undiscerning politician could assume that after so many attacks on Meciar the publication of this fact could endanger the position of the HZDS. It is much more likely that the publication of information from the secret "Z" file could serve to discredit Meciar even more in the eyes of the Czech and Moravian public. Now it would be very difficult for Vaclav Klaus to tell his own nation that he is forming a pro-Soviet government coalition with an agent of State Security (StB).

Nevertheless, let us allow for argument's sake that even this variant would be possible. After all, nothing else was proven against Vladimír Mečiar other than that he was a candidate for cooperation with State Security, which could have happened even without his knowledge. In such a case the federation would be saved, a president—most likely Václav Havel—would be elected, there would even be a strong federal government which assuming a somewhat looser union of the republics could preserve international prestige as well as the economic reform. The weak point of this pragmatic variant is, of course, that it counts on an obviously far too great tolerant attitude of those involved.

None of the above-mentioned four variants of postelection developments, which today are freely circulating through the political and journalistic circles, is exactly the most felicitous one. With one exception—the optimistic one, which, however, is a little too farfetched. The question is, what do we actually want. Three years ago at this time, a communist dictating 40 years in the building, held sway in our country; its methods and practices can be compared to France's fascist brief only with difficulty. But unfortunately we are not Spain and we must drink all of the bitter cup since which the few drops already fell in the autumn of 1989 and which was filled to the brim in February 10 years later. To think that the transition from a totalitarian regime to a developed democracy whose economic progress is not hampered even by political instability of the bitter cup will be a walk through a rose garden would be nonsensical.

Nevertheless, two things about the new elections are already clear without question. First, before the elections both the left and the right will endeavor to again present the elections as a kind of referendum. As the last elections were a referendum by the citizens either for or against communism, the coming elections will obviously evoke the correct perception that at issue is either support for the economic reform or its rejection

including everything opportunity provided by the country, a thriving private sector and a business network with the possibility of becoming a millionaire, but also unemployment and collapse of entire industrial branches which cannot keep up with the Western market system. Unfortunately, the problem of preserving the common state, which it was given to us to live for 70 years, will be pushed to the background, especially in the Czech lands.

The second aspect of the upcoming elections is even clearer. The velvet revolution, which gained for us so much obviously undeserved admiration around the world, will be gone. Apart from the fact that individual parties will obviously leap on each other before the elections, the political scene after 1 June will be in many ways more intense and harsher. Whereas today, voting below the belt happens only occasionally, after the elections it will be happening as a matter of course. A man below the belt of course speaks mainly about the one who delivers it. And democracy depends on citizens carefully observing who it is.

Article Reviews Arms Deals With Libya

U. SCHAFFNER: Prague, RUDOLF TIEBER, in: *Český rozhlas*, 1-26 May 1992, pp. 11-12.

Article by Ondřej Šimek: "Deals With Libya"

[Text] At the end of May, a group of 11 Czechoslovakia who have worked exactly one year for Muammar al-Qaddafi had been negotiating military starting aircraft should return from Libya. In facilities at Tamantifit, deep in the desert 450 kilometers from Tripoli, they repaired armaments, hydraulic systems, and fuselages of L-39 Albatross airplanes.

A group of 18 Czech and Slovak experts returned from the same place at the end of April. According to official ČSSR sources, they arrived here in accordance with the UN Security Council resolution that as of 11 April prohibited UN member countries from delivering military technology and spare parts to terrorist Libya, provide expert military assistance, or conduct regular flights there. Actually, they have returned to Czechoslovakia because their official contract with the DFRPL and A TRADE companies ended, companies that contracted experts for the previously classified project 6780, a training program for Libyan specialists and aircraft technology experts.

Outbreaks for al-Qaddafi

JANE'S states in its 1991 edition that Czechoslovakia has exported 1,728 L-39 Albatross training jets worth \$1.2 billion. Some 1,096 of them ended up in the former Soviet Union, followed by Libya, which received 141 jets.

Other countries, today officially described as countries supporting terrorism, were not ignored. Some 98 jets Iraq 81 and Libya 20. Apart from the so-called socialist bloc countries deliveries were also made to

Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Nigeria. Libya however helped the US in every respect.

The al-Qaddhafi regime has been buying big weapons since its establishment at a 1969 military coup. Until the early 1980s at the beginning of the 1970's made it possible to use the vast crude oil resources to pay for expensive purchases. At that time when Colonel al-Qaddhafi strengthened his dictatorship and declared the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, there was a large influx of military technology into the country mostly from the friendly socialist countries.

About 3000 Alouette and 18 made submachine guns. Czechoslovakia supplied al-Qaddhafi with the following equipment: Soviet ammunition, radios and radio signaling instruments. Armored personnel carriers BTR-50 from Dzhubka and Vatuum—about which we will speak later—and the various tanks from Aero Vodochody were the best. Muammar al-Qaddhafi decided to build his own large air force. Apart from French military mercenaries he also bought an unbelievable quantity of Soviet MiG-21, MiG-23 and MiG-25 planes. Reportedly their number greatly exceeds the air force's needs of for example our country and the number of 1,000 is five times smaller than even 3.5 million people. The dream of the dictator-colonel was to have five-class pilots.

Regional Libyans were supposed to be trained as combat pilots by Soviet experts. Apart from the fact that the Libyans were not satisfied with what was offered to them, the main obstacle to the Romance-language training were the Libyan shortcomings. All the experts confirm the general aversion of Arabs to flying. The would-be Libyan pilots were selected according to quite discriminatory criteria. They reportedly did not meet even basic criteria.

After the departure of the disenchanted Italians, pilots from the former Soviet Union arrived. They were equally unable to overcome the aversion of the chosen Libyans to flying.

Czech and Slovak experts from the Military Air Force Academy in Zlín then took over. Their results were not better, either, but their apprentices finally did earn to be a military pilot than go through a minimum of three stages of training before he can operate combat-air technology. In the first stage, he learns to fly propeller-driven planes acquiring basic skills. Later he transitions to training jets where he learns some combat techniques. Finally, fully equipped combat emergencies are used.

Czechoslovak pilots trained their Arab pupils on the Albatros L-39. They are exceptionally agile craft compared with the international standard for this class of aircraft. They can be armed with two bombs or unguided missile launchers. According to expert testimony, they really are training devices only. It cannot be denied, however, that under certain circumstances they can be used against ill-equipped enemy such as Chad, which

Libya occupied several times. Aero Vodochody also manufactures the L-39 Z-6 airplane equipped with a twin-barrel gun. We did not deliver this one to Libya, however. It was developed for the protection of Czechoslovak borders and defense against slow and low-flying targets if combat aircraft are needed. Muammar al-Qaddhafi can use much more dangerous armaments from his vast arsenals.

We delivered 16 Albatros jets to Libya in 1978. A year later 17 more followed, then 21 in 1981, 44 in 1982 and finally 43 in 1983. According to eyewitnesses who worked in Libya, these planes were not used much. Most of them were parked in desert military bases and burned in sand. As in the case of the combat planes, Colonel al-Qaddhafi went far in his megalomania beyond his real needs.

The AFRO Project

Aircraft deliveries very often result in additional commercial projects. In 1981 we began to build a complex of repair facilities in Tarnahim, Yugoslavia delivering their Orca planes to al-Qaddhafi and began to build in the area. The repair facilities were finished and equipped with state-of-the-art technology in the mid-1980s. In 1983 a contract was signed for the AFRO project, that is a contract which concerns training Libyan workers and repairs of some airplane parts.

If our information from those who worked in this plant is correct, for four years we were unable to produce a single Libyan expert. Libyans participated in advantages provided by the dictator's regime which have a weak work ethic. A paying customer is, however, the boss, even if his payments are irregular. This is why the project continued successfully despite our experts having to perform the repairs themselves.

According to them, some of the planes delivered at the military base in Misr landed at the repair plant from time to time. Despite most of the planes not having flown the appropriate number of hours, they were in perfect condition. Desert storms and insensitive handling by the pilots had their effect on planes parked in the open air. By the way, according to the statements of participants, the pilots flew so seldom that they were putting their own lives at risk. In order for a pilot to maintain his skills, he must fly once a week at least. Libyan pilots reportedly got into the cockpits of their airplanes after even two or three months.

Our experts took the planes apart, cleaned the sand out of them, and repaired them. Some 20 planes were overhauled annually.

We are to receive about 1 billion korun (800) for the entire contract, with the dollar equivalent to be deposited in a London bank. The condition was, however, that the work would be completed within the stated deadlines. This has become a bit complicated because of the UN Security Council resolutions. Again from skipping arms technology deliveries—none were planned until the

UN deadline on 15 April anyway—the federal government renegotiated the APRD project. Despite the fact that it is *arguable* whether training planes fall into the category specified in the Security Council's embargo, it was decided that the experts will be withdrawn. The problem is, that this decision was made while it was clear that they must leave anyway since their contract has expired.

A Strange Deal

According to the testimony of one expert, the first group was to leave Libya on 5 April and a second one by the end of May. Applications for exit visas were submitted in February on behalf of both groups. Nevertheless, a memorandum of the CSFR ambassador to Libya was read to them, warning that the experts do not want to return. [sentence as published] Some time later, the Ompol director in Prague said the same thing.

Of course, this is *suspicious*. For a Czechoslovak, it is impossible to return from Libya on his own. The experts say, for example, that just between Tamanthi and Tripoli there are 13 military checkpoints. Boys, slightly above school age but armed with Kalashnikovs 4-47 submachine guns, are willing to shoot immediately at anyone who does not have documents of appropriate documents. It is impossible for an individual to obtain permission. To succeed in the jungle of Libyan bureaucracy, the application must be submitted by an official entity.

Finances are the other side of the coin. Travel expenses for our workers there amount to \$15 a day. The value of the dollar is weakened considerably by the dinar-dollars exchange rate and food is unfortunately expensive. After returning home, the money earned is enough to buy a better car or make a down payment on a house. Paying their own transportation back home would empty their pockets. Understandably, the experts must wait for air travel to be provided officially.

On 1200 on 13 April, the project manager told them that they would be able to leave for Tripoli and catch the last flight to Czechoslovakia. After an overnight trip, having passed through all the checkpoints, they found out that no plane was about to land. Some 18 experts returned 10 days later via Tunisia.

The remaining 23 experts, who are employed with the X-Trade company, are still waiting in Tamanthi for exit visas and appropriate transportation out of the country.

Apart from them, there are some 600 Czechoslovak citizens working in Libya in various places. They include civil engineering experts who work on advances in civilian projects, and doctors and other medical personnel who are in Libya on private contracts. They are unlikely to leave the country even if the UN Security Council makes the embargo stricter as it did, for example, against the terrorist regime in Iraq.

Most medical personnel have not been paid for months. According to eyewitnesses, Bulgarian doctors, for example, did not receive their pay for six months. They stay on because they dream that the money owed will be eventually paid. Most of them also believe that the embargo is the last step which will lead to the collapse of al-Qaddhafi's dictatorial system. But nevertheless hope the same.

Business Is Business

Czechoslovakia, as well as other countries of the so-called East Bloc, has problems with sales countries such as Libya where we have bad commercial and personal relations and where the returns are good times as are. Despite their unwillingness to pay their bills, they represent a more interesting market than to market at all. Apart from capital goods, such as sugar factories or cement factories, we can also sell our consumer products there. And no weapons.

According to Havel after November 1989 we were supposed to officially put an end to arms exports. This idea proved to be unattainable. It is not just the Soviet nationalists who insist on continuing our long tradition of arms production. A week ago, the "Father" of economic reform Vaclav Klaus described weapons as a regular commodity. VSB Economy Minister Vladimír Škoda said a similar thing recently. Both were aware that as long as Germans, French, Great Britain, the United States, and other developed countries export arms, there is no reason why we should not follow their example.

The problem is that our lower quality weapons can sometimes find markets only in regions where certain prevail. Apart from the new LAAD's submachine guns delivered to Burma, we can offer units even more attractive than regulated versions of the L-1A1 (Afghanistan) and the famous T-72 tanks from Marin Biševac Machine Tools (Emergency). Apart from the Tatra radio location system, we can also offer armored personnel vehicles. In Dubnica nad Váhom, they have been producing them for years and they reflect at the international standard. According to available information, this financing armored and tracked vehicles capable of transporting 13 men and is comparable in many respects with the U.S. Bradley armored vehicle or the German Marder. Its armament is integrated in a top 12 anti-propelled projectiles which can be fired from a cannon, four antitank guided missiles, an embedded machine gun, and a car transport infantry weapons for the passengers.

We have exported a number of them. So far our editorial staff was unable to exact how many. Nevertheless, many experts are able to recall references from the Iran-Iraq war in which these vehicles were used on both sides. Additional deliveries went to Syria, Egypt, Afghanistan, and, of course, Libya.

Recent deliveries of spare parts were expedited on the basis of a license granted in mid-March. According to our information, our government and private firms are interested in continuing this business if the embargo is lifted. Well, business is business. Morality seems to be a naive stagnation from its point of view.

Foreign inmates of Detention Camp No. 5000

630 8805144 Budapest 168 ORA, c/o Hungarian
[1 Apr 91] pg 6

[Interview with camp commander János Kádár and unidentified camp inmates and guards at Komplexusza by Szeres date not given. Camp Situation at Komplexusza—There Beyond the Bars—first paragraph = 168 ORA introduction;

[Text]

Imported Typhoid Fever

The police apprehended 30,000 illegal immigrants in 1991. Those staying in Hungary illegally or without an identified arr being held in the Komplexusza camp until their expulsion. Everyone is classified because of the conditions there. Our correspondent László Szeres talked with "guards" and guards and following a secret brief about attempt with camp commander János Kádár.

[Szeres] Did you come from Bangladesh?

[Inmate No. 1] Yes, I am a student leader from Bangladesh. There are many problems in my country but there are serious problems in this camp as well. Some notes there is no electricity during the night, no medical care, the toilet is often out of order, there is no hot water one cannot move around. Once they took me for some reason to the punishment room. I spent five hours there in the cold.

[Szeres] Were you also beaten by the police?

[Inmate No. 1] I was occasionally beaten and they also used tear gas.

Like in a Dungeon

[Szeres] Are you able to complain or to use the telephone?

[Inmate No. 1] No, no, the telephone is not working. We cannot go anywhere, not even to the post office. And they do not give us enough to eat. One can suffocate here.

[Szeres] You came from South Africa. How long have you been here?

[Inmate No. 2] Eight months. When they brought me in I sent a message to the UN Refugee Committee but I was told that they cannot help because I am being detained in this camp. They can help no one detained in this camp. The guards wake us up every morning at 0530, 0600 to count us every day. No matter what we say, they do not speak English. If they would send me back to South Africa, my life would be in danger.

[Szeres] Why what have you done?

[Inmate No. 2] I was a member of the Inkatha movement and the African National Congress.

[Szeres] So you fought against the government?

[Inmate No. 2] Yes. The worst thing here is that you have to always beg for. The food although is hardly more than bread and water.

[Szeres] And there are Magyars among the Romanians here in the camp?

[Inmate No. 1] We came over to work because the prison work is better because of the prisoners there cannot survive without a job and we thought that we would be able to find some kind of work here another difficulties... easier.

[Szeres] What can come through the green zone?

[Inmate No. 1] We have food packages. We were promised for three days and a 4-hour time is already completed so for me to leave the country.

[Szeres] And who?

[Inmate No. 1] Only because we do not have any documents and we did tell them that if we could not work for two days to just go home. So we caught we have under these circumstances. They were not interested in who was arrested.

[Szeres] So the only reason is that you do not have enough documents or you do not have any valid documents?

[Inmate No. 1] Yes, only that I valid passport everything and...

[Szeres] And what did they say what will happen to you? Will you be deported or...

[Inmate No. 1] We know absolutely nothing about anything. Now they have moved the bar from behind the bars. We had been behind bars stuck together with except me together with arms and legs. What will happen to go now? We do not know we know absolutely nothing. Nothing.

[Szeres] Have you spoken with an attorney?

[Inmate No. 1] We did not speak to him it is not allowed. It is impossible and it is not safe under these circumstances. This is like a dungeon. Do you understand? Ok, the police not think of how many different kinds of diseases we can contract here?

[Szeres] You are in jail here. How do you perceive what is going on here?

[Guard No. 1] It is not pleasant for them but it is not unpleasant for us either.

[Szeres] Do you understand their immigrants?

[Guard No. 1] Basically we interpreters come here only to work.

[Szeres] Water with flour was flowing through the camp bars. Is that what the general situation is like?

[Guard No. 1] It is not always like that.

HUNGARY

[Szesz] And now are you pumping it, or what are you doing about it?

[Guard No. 3] They are pumping the water with a compressor into the bath, that is the only way they can wash it off.

[Szesz] How can these things happen? Do they purposefully plug it with towels?

[Guard No. 3] I do not know.

[Guard No. 1] The truth is that, let us say, these people do not like to work.

[Szesz] What work can one do here?

[Guard No. 1] Cleaning.

[Inmate No. 4] Mine small get sick [as published].

[Szesz] Where are you from? From Romania?

[Inmate No. 4] No. Polish. No doctor. No doctor.

Bath Every 10 Days

[Szesz] Commander, do you agree that these people are being detained here behind bars and under rather inhumane conditions?

[Klauber] No one is being detained on these premises, i.e., at the temporary lodging of Kenyestracska.

[Szesz] I beg your pardon, there are people behind thick bars who said that they are not allowed to take a walk or go anywhere.

[Klauber] It is the interest of the Republic of Hungary and, in many cases, the interest of the guests here that they be dealt with and be expelled from Hungary as soon as possible without any severe means of force being employed.

[Szesz] Part of the room with bars is separated by more bars. Why are there people there?

[Klauber] I see it as an assurance for at least reaching the point where we can clarify the identity of those who are brought here. After we have identified them, they can go outside.

[Szesz] When was the last time you personally were behind the bars?

[Klauber] Well, today, yesterday, the day before yesterday, almost every day.

[Szesz] And what do you feel when you go there?

[Klauber] As a human being, I feel sorry. Not because of what happens to them here. I do not feel sorry about that. We can justly do something about that. As commander, in many instances I feel a little contrary toward the guests, toward those who do not want to stay where they are now but, most of all, do not want to go home although they have been told that they must go home.

Emotionally, I understand that they are ready to do anything. They break, demolish, destroy, and take apart everything.

[Szesz] The way I see it, these people are rebelling precisely against being detained under these conditions. We have seen water with feces flowing between the floors, the garbage has not been collected for months, it seems...

[Klauber] There is a trash can on every floor for people to use. And there is also a garbage can that should be emptied by the guests. Two janitors work here whom I hired in February so that we could keep some order here; otherwise these people would be entirely covered with filth. I have had the house rules translated into 11 languages, and they are posted. What can I do if they do not abide by them or use them to wipe their you-know-what instead of using toilet paper? People from the water works come here twice a week to flush all the plumbing.

[Szesz] The refugees also said that the medical care is inadequate. A young man told me that his daughter is ill but no physician comes here.

[Klauber] There is a paid physician on the premises. The guests can see him on request during office hours, once a week. If you do not believe that, go and see the infirmary. Disinfectant cleaning takes place on Wednesdays, personally verified and signed by the physician.

[Szesz] Does the physician regularly visit those detained behind the bars, if only to check any danger of infection?

[Klauber] Well, the danger always exists. Typhoid fever, scabies, and everything you can imagine was brought in here. I do not want to list them all now. We had these people treated. We fully observe the Kozai [Public Health and Contagious Disease Station] and health regulations. Bathing must be allowed every 10 days.

[Szesz] Does that happen in practice?

[Klauber] Hell, no. There is the hot water, that is, whenever there is hot water, whenever they do not destroy the plumbing, there is hot water every day.

Disciplined Guards

[Szesz] One of the greatest grievances is that they do not get enough to eat. We have seen it ourselves that what they are given to eat would not be given in any camp.

[Klauber] I do not know what else to do. Let us see, today is Thursday. They get 10,954 kilocalories of calories. Tea, butter, and honey for breakfast. Egg barley soup and pork stew with sauerkraut for lunch. So, it is possible when everyone, including you and myself, gets only one dish for lunch, that it is strange that it is cabbage soup, it is possible. I do not know.

[Szesz] Are they not allowed to go, say, to take a walk here in the courtyard? For these premises are well guarded, there is barbed wire, and there are guards.

[Klauber] They will now be allowed to go outside.

[Szesz] They were not allowed until now?

[Klauber] Sir, they have been allowed whenever the continuation and mood of the guards did not have us expecting a breakout.

[Szesz] Recently 30 people escaped from here. What has changed since then? You are still in place. Were the guards relieved, for instance?

[Klauber] Those who were responsible have been disciplined according to the so-called service code. No one has been relieved. I will create the necessary conditions so that this will not happen again because of something for which I could be held personally responsible. As a result, you will find more bars within the building than previously.

[Szesz] Have the conditions become stricter for those inside?

[Klauber] Well, I allow free movement only within a specified area, in plain language, within the building. For the time being, this is the best I can do, no matter how much I try. We do not know, sir, we do not know. All that we possibly can do is at least to maintain the present conditions so that they do not deteriorate.

Hungarian Military Industry Called Nonexistent

9/2/1992nB Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian /4 Apr 92 pp 1-1

[Article by J.Z.G. "No Hungarian Military Industry Yet"]

[Text] The scandal over the Pest Area Machine Works directed the public's attention to the Hungarian military industry. However, Jeno László, director of the Bureau of the Military Industry and ministerial state secretary remarked in one of his statements that there is, in fact, no military industry in Hungary. The goal of his bureau is to establish this branch of industry.

Jeno László stated that at the moment there is no military industry in Hungary, but only firms producing military articles. According to the state secretary, one can talk about a military industry as an organic part of the Hungarian industrial complex as soon as one-third of the technical equipment used by the Hungarian Army is produced by Hungarian industries.

At the moment the percentage of such equipment is minimal, since the bulk of military equipment comes from the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. When asked about the Pest Area Machine Works, Jeno László asserted that this place is not a military factory either; it mainly repairs equipment for the Hungarian Army.

According to Hungary's defense doctrine, domestic production must be established on the basis of the technological needs of the army, since this is in the country's basic interests.

The first step in establishing this branch of industry will necessitate a familiarity with the most urgent technological needs of the Hungarian Army. This survey is expected to be finished by the end of this year. In Jeno László's opinion, the branch of industry which will be created in this way must be open [to competition], and at the same time the protection of defense interests must be assured.

Talking about the role of foreign investors, the state secretary pointed out that instead of capital investors, his bureau intends to assign a greater role to professional investors.

After the scandal surrounding the Pest Area Machine Works, a new storm is building around the Godollo Machine Works, a factory which is also important to the army because one of its tasks is to repair tanks. The directors of the Works declared in a statement that the future of the plant is uncertain because the previous guarantor refused to continue to act in this capacity after the firm's transformation. If the Godollo Machine Works fails to find a guarantor in the future, work must stop on 1 June and the work force must be laid off.

Jeno László declined to answer questions on the Godollo Machine Works, on the grounds of insufficient information.

Tamas Szabo: Bank Privatization To Continue

9/2/1992nC Budapest MEGYERI HIRLAP in Hungarian /7 Apr 92 pp 1-14

[Article by E.P. "State Insurance Company Goes to Dutch Aegon—Tamas Szabo: Bank Privatization To Continue"]

[Text] The State Property Agency (AVU) held a press conference yesterday on the government's considerations of the privatization of banks and the State Insurance Company. As Tamas Szabo, minister without portfolio in charge of privatization, declared, in spite of voices to the contrary, bank privatization is to continue. Moreover, this year one or two banks will be partially privatized in the course of increasing their capital investments. The government has also adopted a strategy of privatizing banks largely owned by the state. On the basis of this strategy, the principal owner will make a decision on privatization, but every bank in question will be treated individually. Privatization must be preceded by a period in which the banks' portfolios are put into order, said Tamas Szabo, but he declined to say anything further on this matter, and he did not comment on how great the amounts are which the large banks still have outstanding in uncertain accounts, estimated by journalists to be 50-60 billion forints. Lajos Csepai (AVU director) later illuminated the background of this policy:

In a certain extent by saying that if the agency is able to sell a bank with a bad portfolio it will do so, but if it is unable to proceed in this manner, the state must step in. Answering an unasked question, he affirmed that a state guarantee by the state may also come into question.

The first steps in the strategy of bank privatization are assigned to increase capital investments and not to sell the state-owned portion of the bank. A privatization partner will only come into question if this partner can supply the bank with fresh capital. The desirable new system of ownership would consist of a strategic investor (i.e., a professional partner), foreign and domestic institutional investors, and domestic small investors. It seems that the relative share of the various types of investors can be freely determined by the banks.

In order to carry out privatization, a new committee on bank privatization is being formed under the leadership of Tamás Szabó, Bank management will also be asked to formulate their own concepts; however, disputed matters will be decided by the government aided by a privatization consultant. By 1 May, bank managers will receive instructions for their own tasks, and the compilation of the entire privatization strategy is expected to be complete by the beginning of June. The bank privatization see also our editorial on p. 1.

Concerning the privatization of the AB [State Insurance Company], Lajos Csépán explained that although the insurance company sent information to 14 possible partners, only one firm replied that it would be willing to join AB. It was the Dutch insurance company Argus, a firm well known on the European insurance market which finally acquired the business. The Dutch company brought fresh capital into AB, and it also bought state-owned portions of the company. Its share in the property amounts to 75 percent. The bank capital of the insurance company thus rose from two billion forints to 3.9 billion forints. Although the state's share of ownership was reduced to 25 percent (there is also a 5-percent ownership by the employees), the state received gold stock of order to be able to maintain its special input in the company's matters, but only for five years. The AVT underwrites an 800-million-forint guarantee in the event that due to new legislation, the insurance company has to pay any certain company compensation for environmental damages. For similar cases the AVT has previously undertaken a guarantee of 10 billion forints, and it estimates that this year 3-4 billion forints worth of guarantees will be cashed in.

State Audit Office Reports on State Debt

János László (21 "W," Budapest, M7) is English 1449 (MT)
16 May 92

[Text] Budapest, May 14 (MT)—At present Hungarian state debt stands at HUF [Hungarian forints] 175 billion forints. See the latest report of the state audit office.

Last year the debt grew by HUF 35 billion, partly as a result of the state budget deficit of HUF 118 billion and partly

because of the development of the forum which added nearly HUF 34 billion to the debt. HU 3. Two-fifths of the present state debt is the result of forum devaluations between 1982 and the end of 1991. For exactly this reason, however, this part of the state debt does not count.

The bulk of the remaining HUF 790 billion state debt carries 9 percent interest, that is 9 percent of the Central Bank base rate for loans borrowed before 1990 from the NBH [National Bank of Hungary]. A smaller part borrowed from foreign governments or the World Bank carries interest rates fixed in the relevant agreements.

Last year the state budget had the full Central Bank base rate of 12 percent on loans borrowed from the NBH. The role of state bond and treasury bill issues in financing the budget deficit is growing considerably. These papers carry annual interest rates of 10-11 percent.

This year HUF 172 billion will be spent from the state budget on debt service. Capital repayment will amount to HUF 218 billion and interest payment to HUF 117 billion.

In the coming years annual interest payments will account for a growing proportion of the state budget expenditures because from this year the Ministry of Finance will not take out Central Bank loans to finance the budget deficit, but will finance the deficit through bonds and treasury bill issues.

The planned budget deficit is HUF 1.1 billion this year, but forecasts put the deficit as high as HUF 1.17 billion by the end of the year.

It is not very likely that the income from privatizations will make much impact on the state debt. Sándor László, vice president of the NBH, said at a press conference today:

There is no decision yet on how privatization incomes will be divided between reducing the state debt and financing the annual state budget deficit. The decision in the matter rests with parliament. István Nagymátyai, of the state audit office told the same press conference.

Impact of Budget Deficit on Social Benefits

42/2001/24 Budapest, NEPSZABADSÁG, 11 May 92
12 Apr 92 p. 1

[Interview with György Naszvadai, Finance Minister, Deputy state secretary Dr. Mária Lakatos plus and data not given. "How High Will the Budget Deficit Be?—Modification of Law Not Yet Complete—No Word Yet on Reducing Social Benefits"—first paragraph is NEPSZABADSÁG introduction]

[Text] We do not yet have exact data on the budget deficit during the first four months, but the trend is steadily downward, declared György Naszvadai, the Finance Minister, deputy state secretary in charge of budgetary issues. It still does not seem possible to

[Kazakov] Whether the more rigorous collection of debts and tariffs can bring at least partial relief to the strengthened budget. As yet, no reduction in social benefits is planned.

[Lakatos] How high is the budget deficit now?

[Nagyvárdi] It is impossible to tell at the moment because for instance the advance payments of pension income tax were due on 20 April. We have to wait until 28 April for these amounts. Another due date is 28 April. That is to say exact data will only be available at the end of the month. One thing is certain. The trend is steadily downward and the deficit is growing.

[Lakatos] Then this year's budget will also have to be modified although it seems this depends merely on the government. [Nagyvárdi]

[Nagyvárdi] This is a great misunderstanding. The law on the state budget which regulates all of these issues has not yet been ratified, but at the time this year's budget was passed, the text of the budget stipulated that in a case like this a supplementary budget must be prepared first. However, the government must do everything in its power to reduce the deficit. We have taken the first steps but we cannot see clearly yet the past few weeks have been too short to show how much the strict measures will reduce the annual gap between our budget.

[Lakatos] Declaring bankrupts depresses the budget of revenues, since the companies do not have to pay back their debts for three months.

[Nagyvárdi] Many people think that this is so, but it is only the debts made up in the name of the bankruptcy which do not have to be paid. We don't know yet how many demands by the state enter "stubs" because of bankruptcy. The real question is, therefore, what the cause of the deficit increase is, namely whether companies have not paid their taxes as in the past, or whether the GDP and consequently the revenues from taxes will not reach the previously calculated level and that the decrease will be greater than expected.

[Lakatos] If the second hypothesis proves to be true, the expenditures will have to be modified in any case. However, there are only a few places left from which money can be taken away. Mostly wage reprobrium could be considered.

[Nagyvárdi] We don't want to touch family allowances, maternity benefits, or pensions. But unemployment compensation must be controlled better because many people work and collect unemployment at the same time. This must be prevented by all means. We need to determine certain contributions to unemployment and we could reduce amounts given in various foundations, although we cannot expect great savings from this. One can call this fiscal terror but we have no choice. We cannot look on while the deficit grows.

U.S. Cable Bid for Budapest TV News fails

CIA 890721A Budapest 061108Z Jun 92
FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
TO AMEMBASSY WASHINGTON DC

(Interviews with Katalin Gergely, head of the Hungarian Democratic Forum's foreign affairs division; István József Pálffy, an official of Hungarian Television; and Frigyes László, president of the Soma cable television company; to Tamás Frei, play and data negotiator; A presumption of Hungarian News Programs Abroad—free cassette for \$20,000—Emigres Are Half of the Future"—first para, paragraph 5, 15A/19A introduction)

[Text] No country would fail to take advantage of an offer of free broadcast time to an American cable television network, especially if that network was for one thing or return, to air programs in the available time period. Well, there happened to be a country that failed to grab such an opportunity with both hands, and that country was Hungary. The Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) entered into negotiations with the American television network about rebroadcasting programs of the Hungarian Television, and wanted \$20,000 annually for the recordings and an additional \$100 per video cassette. Tamás Frei asked questions about this strange incident.

[Frei] Show me a country other than Hungary that receives an offer from an American cable channel for broadcasting its television programs in the evening prime time hours and does not take advantage of the offer because it is unable to mail a damned videotape. This quote comes from the internal political-round message center of Hungarians in America. Lacking a Hungarian television program, Hungarians in America are hardly in the position even though having a television program would help them save informing these people would not hurt at all if the MDF achieves its goal and Hungarian abroad obtain the right to vote in the 1994 elections. This is yet another reason why Soma cable television network's offer to broadcast free of charge in the United States a half hour Hungarian program every day seems to be an outstanding opportunity. The only thing Soma asks for is that the Hungarian programs be mailed to them on video cassettes. The first such offer was made to the MDF in February 1991, when Soma Verhovszki, a man of Hungarian descent living in Switzerland and a friend of the television company head, walked in to the offices of the MDF. An agreement has been reached ever since. What does Katalin Gergely, head of the MDF foreign affairs division, have to say about this?

[Gergely] Look, I am dealing with Hungarian living abroad. This man did not just happen to walk in. He made an appointment and we received him.

[Frei] Why didn't you direct him to the Hungarian Television?

[Georgy] We talked at length with Ferenc G. Pálffy of the Hungarian Television, and discussed what he thought of this whole thing.

[Ferenc] And why didn't you discuss this first with the Television's foreign affairs division?

[Georgy] Well, I don't know. It so happened that we called Pálffy to find out whether it was at all possible to record the television news programs and send those abroad.

[Ferenc] In the end, on what basis did you choose from among the television programs?

[Georgy] We did not choose anything. We have our own television staff, and they wanted to, or they would like to, do this.

[Ferenc] When an American cable television network offers an excellent opportunity to Hungary to broadcast Hungarian programs free of charge, do you think it is appropriate?

[Georgy] Excuse me, not free of charge, there were some financial...

[Ferenc] ...that is exactly what I was about to ask, did you go so far as to ask them to give you money?

[Georgy] By no means, this is why we would have needed, in other words, there were some rather serious financial investments involved, and therefore we simply needed an entrepreneur to do this.

[Ferenc] But you did not find an entrepreneur, instead you asked Sora to give you money. I have the fax message in front of me.

[Georgy] We did not ask for any money, we needed an entrepreneur to record these programs.

[Ferenc] My dear lady, forgive me, but I have the fax message in front of me in which you asked for \$3,500 to cover the investment, and thereafter \$100 for each and every cassette.

[Georgy] Don't you understand? We did not ask for that money. László Páros did. Didn't he?

[Ferenc] Well, he is the MDF's public affairs man after all.

[Georgy] Yes, he is the one who deals with television masters on the public information committee.

[Ferenc] He sits in the room next door to yours. This is why I said "you".

[Georgy] But this is why I am saying that it was not the foreign affairs division.

[Ferenc] This is clear, but it is still the MDF.

[Georgy] In other words, it was requested by a professor.

[Ferenc] A professor, too, was involved in requesting money. Because regardless of what Ferenc Georgy says, his signature also appears on the MDF letter sent to Sora, i.e., the two of them required about \$20,000 for the MDF, in exchange for Hungarian-state-TV television broadcast programs recorded on video tape. The fact that it took them more than 10 months to figure out how much to ask belongs in a business sense. Thus, the MDF agent of this case has been named barely a month ago, when the American television company informed the MDF that it was not willing to pay for the programs because they already incurred enough expenses by broadcasting the programs. Meanwhile, Sora also contacted the Hungarian Television, letters received by Ferenc Hankins were referred to Ferenc G. Pálffy. This is proven by the correspondence regular maintained at the TV president's insistence. Added, though here, too, the Hankins end up as the editor-in-chief of the Herald news program, but he no longer recalls much of the events. Has the MDF asked you specifically as to how to proceed in regard to Sora (also American network's request)?

[Pálffy] I regret to say that I do not recall these events, but I do not rule out the possibility that the MDF, or perhaps the Americans, have come to see me. Things are happening every day, even if those things are not unique to this case, so that a get lost in my memory, but I do not rule out the possibility that they contacted me.

[Ferenc] And are you aware of the fact, or do you recall, that the same television company has written to Television president Elemer Hankins, and that he received this letter to you, i.e., that in the end Sora has reached you through that channel? Do you remember that?

[Pálffy] I do not recall that, we receive sacks full of letters every day, so that this, in itself, means nothing. But it's virtually certain that we did not have specific contact, a program contact [as published]. I exchanged a couple only on one occasion with an American Hungarian named Béla Rónay; he is experimenting with satellite broadcast in Los Angeles.

[Ferenc] How do you view the situation, did the MDF act properly when it went so far as to ask money for the free-of-charge broadcast of Hungarian programs in the United States, or was this a bit too much?

[Pálffy] Television programs are the property of the Television, i.e., no one else has a right to negotiate financial matters or other matters involving royalties.

[Ferenc] In the final analysis there is some contradiction here, or there is a conflict of interest, to say the least. Everyone is talking about the benefit of providing information to Hungarians living in America, since, conceivably, they too could vote in the 1994 elections. But is there an intent of this kind?

[Pálffy] Yes, there is.

[Fer] On the other hand, the representation of this show is hindered by providing programs only if the firms willing to broadcast these programs pay.

[Patty] Well, there is a contradiction to be sure. It could be resolved if the Hungarian Television reached some kind of an agreement with MDF so the World Federation of Hungarians and the World Federation handled the distribution and earnings. This matter has an odd aspect. Programs we put together for consumption in Hungary by Hungarians are not always appropriate for broadcasting in places where viewers are interested in different things. I know that the cassettes they produce here under the heading "news reporting" are filled with Gárdászat (no opposition) and similar things. I do not mean to be depreciatory but it should be obvious that neither Gárdászat nor any other similar organization's peace would appear in a Hungarian news report here in Hungary. One has to add such things for consumption over there in other words. Hungarian programs are not quite appropriate [in America] unless changes are made.

[Fer] Some other television company president František Lachá is next on line. The question: What does he think of his adventures with the Hungarians?

[Lachá] We talked to the MDF and called the Hungarian Embassy in Washington but we also maintained relations with the Hungarian Television. We received many promises, everywhere, from the cultural attachés all the way to the MDF, promised to send us programs but this has not taken place. We got further with the MDF. There the subject of discussion included an agreement but they wanted money. We were not willing to give them money. Scala is a nonprofit television company. We provide services and I tried to make them understand that in this case we are the ones who give something, not the Hungarians, because we provide a free of charge opportunity for you to address Hungarians who live in America.

[Fer] And what was the response?

[Lachá] The MDF's response was clear and unequivocal. We receive programs if we pay, we do not receive programs if we do not pay. I told them in response that we could not afford making payments and so they disappeared. I have not heard from them since. We have relations with 40 countries from Yugoslavia to Japan and thus far no one has asked for money.

[Fer] At the beginning of our discussion you mentioned that you have been in touch with the cultural attaché of the Hungarian Embassy in Washington. Did your negotiations with him break off?

[Lachá] I saw him for the first time in February of this year if I recall correctly. I sent him a fax message then I repeated the message in March, then called him on the telephone. He appeared to be very enthusiastic and optimistic. It seemed that he wanted to help. Since then,

however—and I'm counting—21 days have passed, and he has not returned my call. Despite this, I am optimistic about Hungary.

Problems of Agrarian Reform Viewed

cf. Michael Pann L'ÉTAT DU MONDE, 24 apr 92, p. 11

[Article by Yves-Michel Raux: "Difficult Agrarian Reform in Hungary"]

[Text] Tagújvármegye—As in most small rural Hungarian communities, the 6,000 residents of the village of Tagújvármegye live at their own pace. Only 10 km southwest of Budapest, the village was apparently spared by changes that have shaken the capital in the past two years. Here, transportation is mainly by bicycle, and horses are still widely used for field work. In contrast with most cities, no one has yet tried (or dared?) to touch the "outward signs of socialism". The church square still bears Marx's name and the people's center is on Red Army Avenue. Today as in the past, the main employer is the Cooperative of the Golden Hind, set up at the time of the last forced collectivizations in the early 1960's.

More than an employer, the cooperative sets the rhythm of local life with its soccer team and cultural center. As in most other villages in the country, the mayor and the cooperative president, the two pillars of local government, were reelected to their posts two years ago just after the first democratic elections on the national level. It represents a continuity in management, in contrast with the appeals for "purges" preferred by certain political leaders.

Even if Tagújvármegye did not go to the trouble of changing its facade, it nevertheless lives in troubled anticipation of a radical change. A law passed by the parliament in January provides for the privatization of all agricultural cooperatives between now and the end of the year. In the meantime, the 1,200 cooperatives that work two-thirds of the country's arable land are involved in painful negotiations over the delimitation of land between employees, municipalities, original owners, and the heirs of those whose property was arbitrarily confiscated by the communists.

Triple Uncertainty

This monumental transformation, the most sweeping ever undertaken since the first postwar agrarian reform, is taking place against a backdrop of a triple uncertainty: a serious crisis of overproduction, an inevitable agricultural reorganization, and the conservative government's promise to "compensate the victims of the old regime" by giving them the possibility of buying certain land parcels from cooperatives.

Right now, it is the last point that concerns János Szabó, president of the Tagújvármegye cooperative for the past 16 years. He received a circular from the indemnification Office in February asking him to reserve 1,500

hectares of land for those with "cooperative members." However, he does not know how many persons will show up or whether they will want to rent the land from the cooperative or take it out of the system and have it in their own. "With a question mark hanging over a third of our land, it is impossible to plan our activities," he says. Furthermore, we are having no discussions beyond this year." All cooperatives face the same dilemma: "Our main problem is what to do with farmers who are not planting crops. Throughout Rwanda, orders for seed have dropped 70 percent in one year."

When they passed the new law on cooperatives in January, the deputies were not unaware of these drawbacks. There was a double objective to promote a reorganization of agriculture, which accounts for 35 percent of the GNP, by giving new legitimacy to the cooperatives, now based on the principle of the free association of members. However, the gradual dismantlement has already begun. An order passed by the last socialist government authorizes original owners still trying to take back land incorporated by force into the cooperatives. There are meanwhile aged persons whose members are more sentimental and "nostalgic" than practical agriculturists.

The situation is particularly striking in Tuguru-rumireza. For the past year 152 former cooperative members have withdrawn nearly 1,000 hectares. With an average of 1.68 hectares per family, working such land is already not

a profitable activity. And a peasant is being asked with these further losses: most of those retired persons have to either let the charges for their absent co-owners to others in the management and tributary needed to regenerate their land. The result: nearly half of the land taken out of the system has been put up for sale.

Cooperatives

"There can be no hope for growth and productivity among the old cooperatives because with one land and disappears forever," health minister says. For all farmers, producer associations have shown up in the past few years with the intention to have members farm and manage person. Moreover, cooperatives again attempt without success for a quarter of all exports and cooperatives now 17 to 18 percent of the active population. They have to participate, forced by the collapse of CEMAC and the greater reduction in government subsidies.

Cooperatives are therefore planning for production while half of them are in the red. Through government's re-division of land will come the solution in the otherwise of agricultural structures such as private individual households, small集体经济, markets and foundations (families), churches, associations, business managers. It will be seen that feasible to integrate the red ground resources belonging to the communities.

Political Figures Outside Wałęsa Presidency

Konstanty Duda Polish *Informator* (1981-82) and *Przyjaciel Rządu* (1982-83)

Statement by former and current adviser to President Lech Wałęsa, compiled by Janusz Kusociński, "The Leader—The Presidential Chamber"

(cont.)

(Photographs and brief biography of the persons cited in the following article, with one exception—a photo taken at one of the photographs of employees of the Presidential Chamber, who wished to remain anonymous)

Lech Kaczyński

Wałęsa's associate over four years from January 1981 till January 1985 as chairman of NSZZ Solidarność Secretary General (1981-82). Following the resignation of Lech Wałęsa, appointed to the post of minister of state for security at the Presidential Chamber. Resigned in November 1991.

Jerzy Buzek

Since June 1990 a close associate of Wałęsa and spokesman for his president. Editor in chief of the monthly *TYCZENKA WŁADYCHOWA*, Founder and leader of Center Union Senate (1989-91), Seven Department (1991). From December 1990 until November 1991 head of the Presidential Chamber with the rank of minister of state.

Grzegorz Ciecielski

Associate of Wałęsa during 1981-82 and after his release from Lublin. A leader of the Young Poland Movement, now the Republican Coalition, Senator of state for local governments at the Presidential Chamber (from February until November 1991).

Janusz Mierka

Associate of Wałęsa over four years from 1981-82 and Director of his electoral campaign. In December 1990 appointed to the post of minister of state for national security. Resigned (dismissed) in March 1991, chairman of National Bank.

Andrzej Stryjka

A leader of the Young Poland Movement, vice chairman of the Republican Coalition. During 1981-82 secretary to Lech Wałęsa, member of his electoral staff. In December 1990 he became political adviser to the president, with the rank of undersecretary of state. Resigned in October 1991.

Stanisław Wysocki

Cofounder in April 1978 of Free Trade Unions, which soon afterward was joined by Wałęsa. *TYCZENKA*

WŁADYCHOWA reported in October 1991 his case of the first to publish an article revealing the "power of the journalistic lever."

Jerzy Milewski

Since July 1982 head of the Foreign Coordination Office of NSZZ Solidarność. In February 1991 he was appointed head of the National Security Office. Following the resignation of Lech Wałęsa, in November 1991 he became minister of state for security at the Presidential Chamber.

Hugo Cifkiewicz at the Presidential Chamber
Stand for persons who desired to remain anonymous

We Were With the President

Stanisław Wysocki I was greatly involved in my assessment of Wałęsa. Had I known what kind of president he would become, I would not have participated in his electoral campaign, which does not mean that I would have supported Wałęsa. I would remain neutral.

Jerzy Buzek Even before Wałęsa's election to the Presidency, I worked in Lublin as a K.A.W. (Solidarność National Coordinating Committee) secretary, and already then I had a three-way view of Wałęsa's struggle for the Presidency. I had no plan that that was his ultimate goal.

I wanted Wałęsa to be constitutionally elected by the National Assembly rather than by popular vote, so that his term would be short and, were he to prove himself, he would have a chance to win the popular vote. Were he not to prove himself, or were he to lose the elections, either he would lose the elections, or a parliamentarian could come with a President of limited powers who would be nominated. I always thought that Wałęsa would come to power either by the road I proposed or through popular vote or at the head of a popular uprising.

The last possibility was not serious. I consider a charismatic and world-famous politician standing outside the political system who would say, "Dear I begin to rule things will get better." No government would withstand him. To me it was obvious from the outset that Wałęsa could not be governed in our political system.

Hugo Cifkiewicz at the Presidential Chamber I am dividing Wałęsa's political career into two stages before and after his election to the Presidency. During the first stage he had deserved the name of national hero. During the second he has been displaying confusion and ignorance as to what to do with the country at the polls. Wałęsa lacks elementary knowledge of the nature and functions of the government. Knowledge he had not needed before his Presidency and this is the problem today. The president cannot be a man who has not treated an organization in the strict sense. But Solidarność

has never been clearly speaking as organization. It was a popular movement. Wałęsa has always been a leader never the head of an organization.

Grzegorz Grudziński: I do not regret having voted for Wałęsa at the presidential elections. He was a man who, at time of his standing and political background, was best fitted to lead the country in the direction of privatization, a market economy, and stronger local governments. Unfortunately, he did not realize this opportunity. If I am disappointed in the president, it is at the same that in 1991 he failed to hit the balance by allowing his authority to prevent changes and instead damaged his energies on random political games.

High office at the Presidential Chancellery: The government of Piasecki did not become stronger when Wałęsa became president. Immediately after his election two changes of the Presidency were considered: revision of the existing model, of course with some peripheral shifts, or a fundamental restructuring as in the American model. The plan presupposed: writing over the law individualizing the president's role and forming a shadow cabinet. However, implementing this plan would demand of Wałęsa hard work, talks, consultations, whereas he cannot tolerate uncompromising therapy with persons who are important magnificats and prefers to focus on actual political life.

Grzegorz Grudziński: The Presidency should be a conservative office, but Wałęsa remains as combative as ever and keeps fighting his own establishment. Hence the need for "buffer," for a minimum survival program. When one is president, one should think in terms of historical responsibilities and from that standpoint what matters is not whether Wałęsa will stay in power, but whether and how he will lead the country through a period of difficult structural changes.

A Stock Exchange Dealing in Low Opportunities

Józef Szyszko: As becoming president, Wałęsa had the opportunity to lead the restructuring process, to revolution, in new terms, on the principle of a coalition of forces rather than on the basis of a chartered with the party favoring changes in Poland and to realize these changes with a new diagram. He failed to repeat this opportunity. He became involved in strange games consisting in showing off his personal influence and perverting the old communist system in, among other places, the military.

Aniela Wyszyńska: When the president, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, initiates and strengthens old communist arrangements in the military and before Kołodziejski and Pawłowicz, the means that he comes on his own calling.

The indifference with which he is breaking up the political water is a consequence of his radical failure to understand the nature of government. The case and I, Wałęsa thinks—and to him both are equally important; or perhaps even "I" counts to him more than Poland

Grzegorz Grudziński: Seven from the historical point of view there has been one and this one will be assumed negatively. I fear that we may live on another year. I resigned my office not because I was ordered to do so by Wałęsa but because I had the hope that I could promote, by changing the duties of my office, the grand reform which the country needs on both, and to which the president should have never wholly committed. Besides, I had no support with both.

A Balance Sheet for the Last 16 Months

Aniela Wyszyńska: The one and a half years of Wałęsa's Presidency have not proved constructive at all.

In the social dimension they were a total disaster. It had seemed that Wałęsa was the strongest of all, that there was nothing he did not know already. But the president did not understand the society and failed to move it toward new goals. It must be well talked about it, but it was words, but words, and this used the patience of even simple persons normally most susceptible to the President.

In the economic dimension the results have been less than zero. Disinflation, actions of independent price relatives, of decreasing 100 million dollars against its resources, and slogan such as "For us our own fate."

In the field of foreign policy, nothing has been accomplished, despite such favorable circumstances. We are being forced by the wave of history in a good direction, and for the present that seems enough. But the reason is different. We shall not have to pay the price for our naive illusions and pacifism. Since Wałęsa has not accomplished or continued anything, he has kept procrastinating. The initiative for the Visegrád Triangle trade partnership among Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary did not come from him, although clearly it was supposed to be Poland's duty. Likewise, he has been a failure as far as relations with Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine are concerned. His attitude showed enough timidity as when with a person like Konrad Adenauer that Wałęsa is commanding Poland, this means that it can no longer be large a word.

It is in the political dimension that the disaster is at its greatest. The aim should be to be in fact a dismantler and not build the case. The theory of salvaging the case, cutting down to size those who grow too much and pulling up those who fall and the theories of [rightist and leftist] "lego" (theory of Solidarity) seem to have common measures to disorganize and destroy political life. The policies toward the communists and the CPZZ [All-Polish Trade Unions Agreement] are bizarre, but in the sense of deviations from fundamental values.

Jerry Milewski: The newspapers talk about the crisis of the Presidency but I prefer to see crisis I view the Presidency positively and consider that it is only the beginning. A major accomplishment of the president is the consensus arriving to implement the constitution. I

Grajeda believes that toward the end of Wałęsa's term of office, the authority of the President will be strengthened.

Piątek needs a leader, a leader who will award power in the direction to be followed. Such a person should be the president. In my opinion, Wałęsa is fit to be the president and I believe that, during the period of transition from communism to democracy, he is the best president we could have. Besides, he should have been elected earlier, immediately after the parliamentary elections last June. The choice of Jaruzelski was a mistake that delayed the beginnings of the rebirth of democracy.

Józef Bielecki Wałęsa relinquished to the Sejm (parliamentary power) a center which is not fit for governing the state. To be sure, his political opponents are too much leading to a disaster, but they are lowering the authority of the Presidency, causing confusion, and hurting democracy. The president is not anything he offers to promote the reforms. His lungs want to do more to do so, but his reasoning at this stage is at the level of a factory team leader. The fundamental weakness of the president is that he has lost his former basis for negotiating with opponents and previously serving individuals. Nowhere does it fit his character that formerly used to be unimportant owing to the unimportance are coming to the surface. His lack of education and sophistication casts a shadow on the Presidency. To be sure, he has kept his attack for penetrating the segments of political forces, but in this respect too, he is making mistakes. Example: Vałecka. His lack of political and moral support is causing the president to become a negative factor instead of inspiring and promoting modernizing.

Andrzej Milczewski The president abdicates the constitutional responsibility for national independence, sovereignty, and national security. He is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and chairman of the National Security Council (Normal approximation: Committee for National Defense). Unfortunately, maximum powers supporting a project agreed to these responsibilities remain undefined to this day. This is a deficit of regulation. The president is therefore responsible for matters over which he has little influence and concerning which the powers are unclear because they have not been spelled out in legislation. That also is why, when to take action, better rules are heard than his appeals to popularly elected and normally strong arms, but the whole is not equally empowered, and consequences of its being not informed in time or other case, for a long, increased for the president.

Wojciech Grzybek The President's Chamberlain. Wałęsa failed to inform one side, and he did not prevent others from the chamber from making him work for the President. He is himself aware of this, and that is why he is so hostile toward Kukiz. He who stated it publicly. Wałęsa keeps saying that he can talk with Wałęska, but without "the chamber. But" and

Kuropatka. He'll knock at the weak spot. He said something that Wałęsa is aware and ashamed of.

The Limitations of the President

Arkadiusz Stryjek Having failed to cope with the problems confronting him, Wałęsa got rid of those members of his immediate entourage who were politically important and asked difficult questions and criticized his various moves. Wałęsa became isolated, gave a free compact, and surrounded himself with yes-men. He isolated himself from his advisors, because they forced him to make reforms of which he was not capable. This is the limitations of one who sees a disaster coming. In such a situation, it is easier for him to decide that nobody understands the plans and the power does not growing anywhere. He has forgotten that he himself is the ruler of others.

Wałęsa's isolation now begins to rely on the telephone to be in contact with him. He emphasizes them when he needs something, but to reach him by telephone one has to break the protective wall of yes-men and bodyguards or whom even the final decision as to contacting him, and who being unfamiliar with politics, are creating political facts.

Jerry Milczewski Wałęsa disengaged did not build up a presidential party of his own. Such a party could have arisen on the basis of country communists had he agreed to it. But he believed and still believes that he should be a nonpartisan leader and president. In this sense he has indeed isolated himself. He draws the support of the majority of the society instead of any single grouping. He has chosen the many roads road.

The president lacks a staff of permanent advisers with whom to hold regular meetings. But this does not pertain to his isolation. His contacts with others, with the outside world, are lively and constant. He meets often with both supporters and opponents, and to increase his mileage with particularism opinions of deputies or editorial staffs of newspapers. This is the Wałęsa syndrome as when he used to be the chairman of Solidarność.

Wojciech Grzybek The interview and radio are on full time. When Wałęsa speaks on the telephone, he talks with one side the chamber that uses the parliamentary committee while at the same time covering the TV camera and listening to the radio. This is a situation of all contacts and the communication problems are usually not enough as was held. This is where difficulties the president avoids having to make decisions.

Grzegorz Grajeda It used to be Wałęsa's rule that to have time to work with individuals representing the biggest political trend. Formulation for a new Army (or army or right now important Polish political party) cannot find any concerned suggestion of cooperation with Wałęsa who believes that the center is the fundamental

which Poland's future shall be built. At this point the office of the president has for the time being been forfeited.

Jacek Morkut More than 4 billion zlotys [2] remain in Wałęsa's electoral campaign fund. I thought that it should be spent sensibly and together with Leszek Kaczyński, the deputy campaign chairman, I wanted to call to establish a foundation for stopping the brain drain and keeping in the country gifted young people who would be identified by means of contests. The authors of this idea were the sociologists and psychologists working with our campaign committee.

We went to the president to acquaint him with this project and obtain his approval. Wałęsa said no to be seated in armchairs. Before we even began to speak he jumped up, crying "Tele-dystopia [program]!" He turned up the volume full blast on the television so that I found it difficult to continue the discussion. We accomplished nothing. Leszek [Kaczyński] was upset when we were leaving. It was then that he, a major fellow contributor to Wałęsa's success, decided to return to Gdansk. Afterward I learned that the president left to the Reyniwot Cobula the decision on what to do with the campaign fund.

Stanisław Wyszyński Some of Wałęsa's actions have become kind of automatic. It seems to him that he is doing something. He repeatedly speaks of, e.g., the EC or NATO. He becomes well-informed and thinks that others possess the skills that he is trying to seize. But he himself is transparent to others and it is evident that the emperor wears no clothes.

Józef Szczepański Wałęsa is ill with a pathological narcissistic love. The words he uses often are "I" or "the president." "I" did it. "I" forced it. "I" warned against it. I cannot tell what is the precise nature of his public activities, will-force or something more.

Without a Plan

Andrzej Sylwestr Wałęsa could have called himself a broad base of support for the reforms. But this would have required a clear vision of the goal and plan of action, identification of the most important priorities, and consistency in realizing them. Nowhere in the course of his career have problems in formulating the direction in which the president is moving.

Wałęsa did not want to be a slave to any plan. He did not believe in planning. Communists collapsed without a plan, as did the Berlin wall. It is difficult to oppose such arguments. He was unmoved by the fact that the page in Mr. Thatcher's little plan for several hundred days ahead. He said: "With the good Lord known what I will be doing tomorrow, so how can I tell what I will be doing in a year?" The lack of a timetable to be followed for the next five weeks has been a major weakness of the government during the period when I had served in it.

The prime minister's explanation that the prioritization of solutions to every problem means that he has no solution whatsoever (everybody knows that Wałęsa is not a person that has to act on a timely basis, then he doesn't do enough).

Agnieszka Płoszaj Wałęsa had much opportunity to become the author of several major national undertakings that would ensure his place in history. He had considerable international support, international prestige, the best qualified young associates and, had he wanted it, even the support of the opposing party.

In the Northern Solidarność and United Front election Wałęsa is already a historical figure. But he could have brought Poland into the EC and Nato and formed a modern military, had he believed better criteria for the actions of the government. Wałęsa formulated goals. Wałęsa failed to coordinate with a plan. Wałęsa does not have necessary requirements for governing. To begin, in day-to-day actions, to a maximum extent, to be put in broadest terms for all categories enabled good deals and the Polish Virgin Maryness there in the right direction. A president should be a strategist. The commanding center in Wałęsa's strategy. This constitutes similar to the journey over to the province of the state.

The Daily Life: Stories of Projects

Andrzej Sylwestr The absence of specific goals, the continuing erosion and the chronic crisis against Wałęsa's equilibrium and turn everyday activities into a nightmarish Wałęsa shows, with people to get out, does not listen to others. He feels that the situation is too much for him. That is why I believe him when he speaks of wanting to resign, of not staying in Presidency. When he conveys to the press an assessment, the right-hand is silent in every statement affirming that the last [I or in Polish] letter which he has signed pertains. None from the word passed in his life. I don't want to hear I have to — this assessment reflects a greater inner anxiety before.

Jacek Morkut At the beginning the prevailing belief is that the so-called basic (having something yet nothing, knowing little about economy) is the instrument for increasing power. Whoever has the tools, he has power. Whoever has more tools, he has more power. This principle is universal, and Wałęsa's tools are being concentrated in Wałęsa himself.

He fails to see the threat the no. Wałęsa tolerates the principle that it is better to sustain a certain situation in the atmosphere of reticence, than to return fire and to generate of the elements of his success. I also fear that it would be unfortunate for the president to fight at the moment a battle with KLD against Gorbachev's residue in Moscow. I did not provide him with the information. I did not know and did not want to do so. With Wałęsa involved the cooperation with the angels will be possible to win a number of almost lost. Following one of Bismarck's in a reaction to the following repeated actions, not based on any clearly formulated plan of

wanted. The point was to get rid of the Germans in order not to distract from the very idea of dismantling racial and national antagonisms in Germany.

America's **Ministers** Several months after Mitterrand's departure the government offered to withdraw from the process of a single currency or national defense. But Mitterrand rejected the offer because he was bound by the terms of his contract as the chairman of Solidarnosc Bank. Had the government been having some discussions about how often he would have made this offer to him?

Renewed **Worries** These were some reasons for the strong reaction in which the French intellectual movement has participated in recent days for doing nothing. Some days following in his education, being aware of what the AF was up to, he was disengaged. The situation is absurd. Noting that it is difficult to imagine the fact that nothing is being accomplished here that there is a reason that has to be filled by others. For example, the main concept of Poland is becoming an element of the AF, and Solidarnosc is typical of others, a typical continental device for covering up local issues. The Soviets are now leaving home to stand and this cannot be ignored ever.

Georges **Kremer** Unfortunately, Poland + political + economic + social + ethnic + cultural + personal + other +... In Poland personal issues are concerned with public interests that it is difficult to separate from. It's a complex situation. He would not be satisfied with a good personal change in the president or removing certain problems.

“Competitor”

Huge **effort** **at** **the** **Chancellery** From Dr. Ingénierie Georges Le Gall, had been proposing to Mitterrand a challenging but dangerous path in which there could be both nation or defense, or autonomy—building together a coalition against the [Center-right]. I know that it is against the majority of the intellectual class. Polanski was convinced, however, it would be he and not Kremer who would bear political responsibility for any defeat. Kremer was concerned with dividing public opinion among significant segments.

The center's government-building required an element of building, but it must be admitted that his political analysis was incorrect and this also was to damage the French in the process of re-defining new electoral rules under the Pinochet's constitution the president has the right to dissolve the parliament upon certain conditions. But instead of dividing public opinion into different segments, who would really reward Démocratie + Social and a center-right or a Socialist-Democratic government, and if the subsequent government under Roger Salengro that would result in the minimum and indifference in the left.

Le Gall, a moderately superior to Mitterrand, who tried at first for one class. He was difficult to convince being a kind of socialist and leading different political views,

he did not want to become Subcommissaire although offered him to their superior. If a political plan could not change with it, that plan are altered. But there has to go, and so it was difficult to submit political declarations of loyalty. Nowhere in Paris has an interview which, in a word, has changed in the last 10 months to look like nothing rather than in Poland or in previous years. Kremer has remained for this.

Another **Racecourse** Since started negotiations in advancing forward the idea of neutrality and having good relations been passed to the right for half year in the right. It was not only had imposed on him, of the matter a struggle that had to be waged continuously over the road until the dissolution of the parliament. I used to be attempting in the parliament to pass those changes been would have been a good rationale for its dissolution.

Left **Racecourse** M+ brother and I had the idea of blocking the Government using this new opposing political ideas. Mitterrand supported this idea and began to speak of the word the new left, our right and our left. We organized the Center Guard, which prolonged the formation of the BII+II. It was a “Mitterrand Committee” between. But this was not the end of it. Mitterrand, he used in favor of a third, a fourth even a seventh “leg,” and at a certain moment we realized the conclusion that he was going to do something or his power to manipulate language and differentiate the political issue. However, that was to his advantage. Mitterrand proved to be a good partner of our campaign for only the first six weeks. Afterwards he tried to prevent the Center Guard from becoming a major force in the PII about 20 regional councils, which wanted to join the Center Guard, but he blocked them from doing it.

And this is characteristic of Mitterrand. At the same time (another) kept pushing toward the goal, which does not mean that he was a friend of Mitterrand, who became at that was a propagandist in private who claims as independent process of his own.

Huge **effort** **at** **the** **Chancellery** However the PII+II and of the Economic Ministers like Dr. Ingénierie that they are plannings and negotiations, without will from the ones work hard. Then there Ingénierie and Dr. Dréze will. While Georges Kremer was the head of the Presidential Chancellery, it performed well and some time later Ingénierie, now at that office a negotiating and compromised matters are piled up. The two head of the Chancellery is Zelenka, but actually it is administered by Walewski.

“A Spying for Government”

Huge **effort** **at** **the** **Chancellery** Mitterrand Mitterrand left in a while ago. He perceived the treason of the intelligence and turned the former communists. He believed that anti-national individuals would be used outside the establishment around friends of the other government, covering—and would not get anywhere. A few will never live and death user.

Lech Wałęsa's press spokesman (Dziennikarz) commented on the radio that the letters are such that we need immediately informed politicians. He claimed that statements in the name of certain People like Wałęsa, and Ciszewski, can always be good without the least qualification. Letters are always that sort of day care used by the last day of their career. Such are the rules of the game which they always follow. Ciszewski, though born that whatever is happening at the Belweder is quite often—just another golf.

Antoni Wyszkowski Wałęsa who shoulders the enormous burden of having to be good a cultured and polite is used to gather round him individuals who represent pragmatism, common sense, and modesty a word. The importance of good. He is to be a character, ready to carry on the moralization of others, but he has also a particular psychological meaning and is a person concerned for his own personal gain. Sometimes these funds financial matters for him. Therefore, he has to be surrounded by persons loyal to him who depend exclusively on him, because without him there are nothing. They cannot be politicians or individuals who could bring him in one way or another. They have to be his reliable slaves, so that in deriving personal advantage from being associated with the president, they could also be advantageous to him. The motivation results in attracting a growing number of persons of doubtful morality and creates a counter-creeping climate within the president's entourage. And, to surround himself with such people is an essential psychological need for Wałęsa.

A Game of Musical Chairs at the Court

High official at the Chancellery The Reverend Fr. Leszek Ciszaś lives at the same place as the presidents' Minister Wałęsa and Press Spokesman Ciszewski and previously never spoke from him. This is dictated by mutual respect. Wałęsa, says from his speech, both openly and less. He looks for support and respects. These persons in turn try being closer and then should constantly in their absence pursue their goals. That Wałęsa walks himself off from the world by means of his helpers, instead recognising and the media represented by the press, is a consequence. His immediate entourage shapes his view of the matter and who finally controls the access of information to him. Such loyalty and concern, relying on about written article ground for strategic and operational.

High official at the Chancellery Wałęsa is aware of his own situation. He perceives Poland's situation through and is incapable of remaining in the situation and reports on the state of the nation. But, for example, at this evening press photo-meets involving officials in Lech Wałęsa. The information to a presented with officials both important matters and answers from the most obscure promotional press, the journalists etc. He made stuff about himself and has no longer enough time to familiarise himself with important reports. He does not understand where the press criticises him.

High official at the Chancellery The courtesies are clear that especially they are considered mediocrities. There know who and whom interests them, and they bring each other informed others. e. to other power centres in the world the influence may be minor, but in the Belweder power culture expects to prove itself to a constant struggle to preserve her place in the hierarchy of power.

Antoni Wyszkowski I was not in direct contact with the presidents after discussing with him with some of others I would bring back even though he wanted to include me in the "court" and maintain an office at the Belweder. I was not interested. At first I had thought that Antoni Wyszkowski was the presidents' closest adviser then. But until before the Belweder my closest friend would have been, according to me,

High official at the Chancellery The presidents' men have an opinion of their own, but they are skilled at fitting themselves to every occasion. They are capable of convincing the president for a position closest to the best for the Russians. They are unwilling to sacrifice the half-baked or erroneous interests. Normally, presidential election for such posts a very discriminating. Wałęsa is now, am aware that they suggested to work at the Belweder over themselves. They believe that, since they had higher importance than they do not have to bear responsibility directly involved. They consider it a better alternative another offices in offices which closed to consider more. They do not contribute to the progress of the government. In the Belweder such persons are believed to with the exception of one aspect. A job starts to usual from the head.

Jacek Maziak A documentation should have competent documentation and substantiation who would suggest to take specific measures and taking documents ready for signing. Otherwise everything begins to become a farce as in the case of the appointment of Jacek Maziak to the post of minister of sugar for national economy. In particular Wałęsa's poem "It Is Burning."

I happened when the Kaczyński brothers and Marek Zalewski were leaving the Chancellery. Lech Wałęsa was committed to the Belweder and invited them to Minister Wałęsa, who confirmed to him his appointment. Subsequently he is to remind him with the former government transferred to Lech Wałęsa. Maziak said after about the post of secretary of the KPRM "National Defense Committee". "There will be much in a minute. They bring the form. But it has not been closed." And Wałęsa asked what written? What E&K? Then Maziak gave him a short extract of the law. The Commission the president, the president, and the members of the KPRM. "Who is he?" asked Wałęsa. So Maziak confirmed the author. One note on Wałęsa naming Maziak as the successor to some committee general and then naming Zalewski, although on the bed over whom his letter of appointment. And, who is or was he too? It was a question. "The National should be informed of who the form at the top is reading." Wałęsa went up with singer Wałęsa famous. A

waking in his office, because it is Friday afternoon and he wants to go to Gdansk, his place of resting at the weekend, with the migrants round up. "When the pump is broken, the problem is big. Water flows into the barrel and the barrel is full." Wachowiak lifts the telephone and calls the Chancellor. "Was Zawisza appointed?" "Don't know." "Find Zawisza at once. Send a car for him." There is passing Zawisza's residence to be found. "Too bad. This happens to any barrel. Better call the barrel-maker quickly." Wałesa gets more and more nervous. Finally, Zawisza is located. He asserts that he is a communist. A letter of recall and another of appointment are rapidly prepared. Wałesa signs both it and copies for the officials. The Polish state is fortunate. It now has a M.I.A. secretary.

America's Secretary Wachowiak once asked me to interview with Wałesa in order to have him and Drzymała appointed as ministers of state. He wanted me to do it "in kind of a peace treaty" with me, while at the same time threatening that he could get the appointments on his own authority. I went to Wałesa to voice the objection. He said, "You are funny. So they are to be ministers of state?" But "A few months ago they both got these posts."

Huge official at the Chancellery I know that Wachowiak liked Łukasiewicz so long but and Drzymała got promoted. When Łukasiewicz refused, several months later, any written nomination letter of appointment and got Wałesa to sign them. There were many reasons why they wanted to get appointed to these posts. For one thing, Drzymała then became the official superior of Bielecki, and Wachowiak the official superior of Krzysztof Piątek. Secondly, the promotion enabled them to a large official apartment. To this end standard apartments at 102 Szwedzka Street are now becoming converted into studios.

America's Secretary Wałesa's judgment of human relationships is flawed. His feeling that everyone in his circle ought to live on personal gain and promotion without much in return is striking. When he wants to persuade someone to do something, "You will get nothing for half a day." Wałesa knows that in present-day political-ideological circles half a day is like an eternity. But on the other hand he does not realize that there are people who follow other goals in their lives.

The Butler's World

America's Secretary Nowadays the assessment of the President is extremely critical. I did not expect everything to be bankruptcy but I had my thoughts that things would be as bad as they are now. I did not former Wachowiak.

Left Sacrement Wachowiak is an influential personage and his role in the government is huge. He is the organizer and capable of anything. His presence in the Sejm is as small to the country. He is trying to gain influence in, and acting in a far-sighted web of underground enterprises, those domains of public life which lie

between socialism and the judgments about him between a real socialist. In other words, the armed forces, the special services, the Economic power and their members, the banking system.

America's Secretary I am not denying that it would be difficult to prove that Wachowiak is a Major General in the Ministry of Internal Security but sufficient evidence can be collected at last. Wachowiak is a soldier. I am referring clearly to events for which there are witnesses. This time was the moment of damage from Wałesa's speech at Pruszków or the frequent presence of General Kondruskiwski at Wachowiak's office. A general who has served first in the Sejm could prove that Wachowiak is playing a dangerous role.

Although the very fact that someone who is hardly known at all, whose background is strange and who lacks the political and professional qualifications, has become a secretary of state and one of the most influential individuals in the country, is to say the least, surprising.

Major accusations have been made concerning Wachowiak, but I have never discussed this person's past of birth. Many clues are provided by a study of his background, especially from the moment he first had appeared with Wałesa in 1980 and of the character traits. There also have been various signals from other quarters.

Let me state some facts about him collected from publications:

Wachowiak is at the center of clandestine military networks, including those in the special services. He is close to contacts with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, especially with General Włodzimierz the commander of the V-motor units of the Internal Security Corps (AKB), whom he tried to appoint the minister of internal affairs. As known, the AKB is the last surviving remnant of the (constitutional) régime. Its officers had been selected more freely than the officers of the old Bielski Constitutional Security Service. It had been assumed (by that régime) that in the event of a crisis in the Republic the AKB was to be the military formation of law itself counteracting the maximalist populists and the Right-wing armed forces.

Wałesa is a general of the red constitutional régime. His cooperation with Wachowiak has assumed various forms, of which the most notorious was the nomination of the Sejmender by AKB personnel in return for the so-called daily meal rations, which turned out to be very expensive. Wałesa has often visited with Wachowiak, who has repeatedly defended him like a true Sejmender and before Wałesa. When Wachowiak began to go and get the position of minister of internal affairs for Wałesa, upon questioning on every occasion the qualifications of Minister Wałesa, everybody began to fall into a logical whole. For them Wałesa would be the second after Kondruskiwski, commanding minister (generalissimo) on Wachowiak. Furthermore, the Wałesowicze reacted in silence.

In the past, when entering the Government, I often saw hanging in the cabinet the portraits of the president and images of an admiral. I had no doubts that they belonged to Minister Kondruszewski. After all, we do not have many admirals in the Polish navy. At first I had thought that it was Wałęsa whom I was going to see and I even feared that his visit would prevent the seeing the president. After another, however, I realized that Kondruszewski was visiting with Wałęsa.

For a long time Wałęsa visited Wałęsa against the idea of the [Poland + anti-Soviet-Polish] Triangle and specifically against Rzeszów and the Hungarian-Polish axis. Then suddenly he changed his mind. I had thought that this was prompted by Wałęsa but later I found out that this was due to Wałęska's influence.

In fact, Wałęska has been exerting an increasingly influence on fundamental national policy issues. What is more, this not because he is some unbalanced optimist. On the contrary, there is a certain pattern of thinking to it, which makes the very suspicious Wałęsa to distrust Wałęska's motives from the outset. I would say that this consists precisely in the concentration of power breaking and alternating a policy of rapprochement and stronger ties with the West. She, acting in these directions has been more than radical.

High official at the Chancellery Wałęska is strongly familiar with the language understood by the juniper of the former "opposition." We know how to make veiled threats and ambiguous hints which don't let them apprehend. "The power of Poland belongs to the president, and it is the president's will that this or that... you know... is implemented," he says.

Lech Kaczyński Wałęska has been practicing the technique of "silencing dissent" on Wałęsa's former associates. The first to be fired was Antoni Pieśko followed by Arkadiusz Rybicki. As regards me and my brother, he had reportedly proposed to an attachment for fundamental reasons, we turned down Rybicki as a result. He does not keep his word. We again admitted that he was going to decide who would go and who remain at the Chancellery. He reportedly informed us "the president's will, although it remained unvoiced. He displayed an unusual self-confidence. I cannot account for his phenomenal career. He had remained after whom years in September 1992, and within a couple of weeks, to become Wałęsa's further one. He has once been in almost uninterrupted contact with Wałęsa and with the other's family, as well. I think that his democratic-Grundtvigian and uncolonial attitude which Wałęsa's political needs."

There are matters commonly known at the i Naukowca that are extremely difficult to prove. Minister Wałęska was often also caught by Pieśko in the act of robbing and appropriating \$1,000. But the president made him return the money and thereafter the matter ended.

High official at the Chancellery In December 1992 Wałęska, referring to a subsequent will of the president received \$1,000 from S.M. the representative of I.F. an American millionaire of Polish origin who was friendly with Wałęsa. In the conversation with S.M. Wałęska claimed that the president was in a poor financial situation and therefore, on his behalf, he was requesting \$1,000 initially for the upkeep of the president and his family. He received the \$1,000 as the first payment. Feeling upset, however, S.M. called Pieśko who then contacted Lech Kaczyński, who in his turn communicated the matter to Wałęsa. Wałęska was ordered to return the money without being informed about what it was.

Lech Kaczyński Wałęska's approach was growing. He used to complain. I assume that initially he had wanted to remain as influential staff of staff in Wałęsa. But later he concluded that he could attempt to seize control of the i Naukowca. I fear that the Wałęska problem is being concealed in the political crisis apparently at the juniper that while the Kaczyński brothers presumed that Wałęska is a threat to the country, this latter for me

Jacek Milewski I am a member of an administration staff arranged by Minister Wałęska according to Lech Kaczyński. I do not know of any Secretary of State Wałęska, in Wałęsa's staff of cabinet, and hence he organizes the schedule of the head of state. This is an extremely important difficult and thankless job. In the United States a similar role is assumed by the "White House Staff of staff" who, although not formally a member of the government, is known to be one of the most influential members of the president's entourage. Wałęska plays an important role that any party that Wałęsa is in some way under the control of the staff of cabinet who puts the strategy in motion. So one can fully understand in this President Wałęsa is nothing but a tool of his control.

Antonius Włodarczyk Wałęska is not being guided by any historical goals. It is the ambition of presidents to be positively inscribed in the history of the state and the nation. But in Wałęska, the sole goal is to remain in power and to live and have fun. All of a sudden someone ends without a just, who has never done anything for humanity. Has become the second most important person in the nation. He was even received by the British queen. It turns out that human is garbage that it can be sold like an aging mare, horse, and rabbit, while she remains barren. That someone like Wałęska can divide the fate of a great nation for the Poles is the laughing stock of history. But this confirms the Wałęska's vision of the world.

The Dark Mirror of the President's Soul

High official at the Chancellery I estimate Wałęska is due to the fact that he has been self-interestedly building Wałęsa's own and in reality few others. Minister is an excellent psychologist for a leader with Wałęsa's needs. He allows how to clean him up. Safer

him, or make him nervous so as to keep him in the right screw mood, which Wałęsa likes. Lastly, he is available 24 hours daily. He is on the Belweder all day and all night. After all, no normal human being could stand it.

Jerzy Buzek: Wachowiak is creating around Wałęsa an atmosphere of disdainfully, cynically, and venomously popular treatment of national interests and interests of state. This is being done on the principle of inflicting psychological torture. Some people get drunk, others curse, while others still shut themselves up in the bathroom and shout. Wachowiak releases Wałęsa with a potent dosage of grossly expressed contempt for the world, tinged with humor and a fervent, if not mortified, kind of cheerfulness. Were Wałęsa to become better educated and more sophisticated, he would find this to be intolerable. Thus, Wachowiak is nothing else than Wałęsa's shadow, his "black" side. He does not have two faces; his own face is generally opaque.

Jerzy Buzek: Wachowiak is satisfying various kinds of Wałęsa's needs, especially psychological ones. Perhaps he has something on Wałęsa? I do not know. Wachowiak himself told me that Wałęsa keeps throwing him out of his office several times daily and almost literally wiping the floor with him. On the other hand, he attaches tremendous credence to Wachowiak's opinion. Wachowiak is short and intelligent. He has guile, the criminal kind of guile, being ready to do anything to gratify the president. I have repeatedly posed the issue of Wachowiak in my talks with the president, as the principal topic of our dispute, but whenever I demanded his removal I always received an evasive answer.

Jerzy Buzek: In order to veil properly one's private life one has to find individuals who would not be loyal to the values publicly expressed by Wałęsa. This is the secret of Wachowiak's success.

Wachowiak is always seen in the president's entourage, but publicly he does not come, grants no interviews, and does not explain anything. That is his function. He is to be visible only to the president. He is to attend only to "dark" matters. Besides, if the problem is viewed pragmatically such matters do not have to be so secret. Certain things can of a certainty be made public, as for example by acknowledging that money is needed and the president has somehow to get it.

The Moscow Putsch—The Hour of Trial

Lech Buzek: The news about the coup in Moscow reached me at the very dawn. I immediately left for my office and called the president, but he told me that he had already spoken with someone and did not need me. I was not invited to the Belweder. It was then that I had decided to resign from my post as minister of state for national security, although, for various reasons, I submitted my resignation much later, just before the elections.

Jerzy Buzek: At that time, I and my brother had been trying to obtain guarantees from NATO. It looked

like the Moscow coup provided an occasion for this, but everything went wrong. Wałęsa rejected an interesting offer of mediation in this matter. Moreover, at our agreement, he did not want to convene a meeting of the National Security Council, he wanted that he himself to advise.

The 1st August Putsch informed me again with 10 p.m., I ceased to visit the Belweder. Besides I had been keeping the letter of resignation in a drawer since last spring. Like my brother I adopted a resigned attitude in awaiting the elections, fearing press attacks about our being "dumped" in connection with the TELEKAF affair.

Lech Buzek: I decided to act through my frequent contacts with the prime minister. Bielecki appointed a special taskforce at the ministerial level which discussed, in addition to a general assessment of the situation, the threat to the eastern border, not so much by the Soviet Army as by refugees. I tried to emphasize NATO's recognition of Poland and other countries of East Europe. I believed that the Moscow coup afforded an opportunity for Poland's obtaining certain guarantees from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The estimates coming from the West made this belief seem realistic. Everything took place within 48 hours, and everybody was aware of the scale of the events and of the resulting dangers.

On 19 August I had officially proposed convening the National Security Council, but soon afterward, in the afternoon, I learned that nothing would come of it. Lech told me, "I am like a fish in water and I am handling it all, and Minister Wachowiak is helping out." He made it clear that it was exclusively his affair.

Jerry Miliński: The president presumably did not convene the National Security Council because he did not think that it would markedly assist him or the government in this matter. Besides, any member of the Council has the right to convene its meeting, but no one had demanded it, neither the minister of foreign affairs nor the minister of national defense, nor the minister of internal affairs, nor the prime minister. The president convened with members of the Council singly or in small groups, though never with the Council as a whole and never at the Kier-Łądkiewicz offices of the National Security Office, but rather several hundred meters further at the Belweder.

Jerzy Miliński: The president did not convene the National Security Council, a body constituted especially for such occasions. Instead, as he commanded, he appointed some informal, unrepresentational body whose members, other than Minister Drzewiecki, Minister Wachowiak, and the chaplain, Major Alfred Przeciwski Cybula, were unknown.

Jerry Miliński: The prime minister had appointed an interministerial crisis taskforce. During the Moscow Putsch the presence of 45,000 Soviet troops remained in

Poland became a threat. Strongly anti-communist, this was not a big force, but it was sufficient to organize some provocation.

Lech Kaczyński I and my brother pressured Wałęsa not to engage in the next round of talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops, especially considering that Ambassador Kashev, on being summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, declared that the new [Moscow] government should be treated as something permanent, whereas in our assessment the putsch was collapsing. The Russian side did not know itself whom to represent. Yet the Ministry of Foreign Affairs desired the talks, and they took place, without making any progress though.

Jerry Milkowski I headed the National Security Office and was deputy minister of state for national security. The National Security Office has no executive powers, and no military or police formation is subordinate to it. It merely gathers and analyzes information for the benefit and use of the president and members of the National Security Council, as well as formulating proposals. We manned our offices round the clock and waited for the events to unfold.

As Unveiled Scenario

Jacek Mieczek II If a military coup of basic importance to the security and sovereignty of Poland takes place in a neighboring big power, the mechanisms of state should be set in motion in accordance with a secret preset plan. The president should convene an immediate meeting of the National Security Council at which the ministers of national defense, foreign affairs, and internal affairs would present their reports. He should also appoint an ad hoc taskforce. Under his constitutional powers, he should likewise convene an extraordinary session of the government. At the same time the president's press spokesman should proclaim his message to the nation.

The president, who is at the same time the commander-in-chief of the Polish armed forces, had the duty of appearing on TV with a patriotic message, such as had been proclaimed by President Kennedy during the Cuban crisis or by [Polish Foreign Minister] Beck following Hitler's ultimatum. That a few hours is made. The resulting address could have been enunciated in the cause of Polish political speeches. But what actually happened was that Minister Dzieciolowski recited wordlessly some text. That was not what the nation had been expecting at such a dramatic moment.

Annoyance, feelings of impotence, and growing fears of personal security (I heard that Wałęsa ordered strengthening his bodyguards, service phone calls to Jaruzelski and [the ex-Minister of Internal Affairs General] Kiszka—this was how the president had behaved during the first hours of the putsch. If one envisions Jaruzelski, who has influence with the potential vectors of the putsch, this means disbelief in the ability to control one's own army. That is not how the head of an independent state behaves.

Aleksander Wyszkowski Wałęsa was urged to speak out on television. But he waffled and finally refused. The need for a public address by the nation's leader in the hour of potential danger to Polish statehood was so obvious that Prime Minister Bielecki volunteered to deliver it himself in front of the cameras. But after he had drafted the text of his address, Wałęsa forbade him to deliver it.

Jarosław Kaczyński Wałęsa evidently believed that the putsch would be victorious, although Bush's comments indicated that it was collapsing. After all, Bush would not pose the main threat and engage in a confrontation with a long-established power that owns 10,000 nuclear warheads. Yet already as soon as Monday afternoon Bush took an incredibly firm position.

Until the last moment Wałęsa ignored Yeltsin and bet on Gorbachev. I believe that this reflects his political infatuation and dependence. I do not know whether it was under the influence of the press or owing to some other signals that he declared, "That Yeltsin is a trap."

High official at the Chancellery Wałęsa believed that he pursued a splendid policy on Russia by adopting a win-and-win attitude and showing no sign of support for any competing party, except to support Gorbachev.

High official at the Chancellery It was being seriously suspected that the KGB, which survived as an imperial structure, is engaging in espionage activities in Poland with the object of maintaining a weak government in our country. While there is no proof of this, many interesting considerations exist.

Jarosław Kaczyński Even long before the putsch, mediations had been proposing a spectacular meeting between Wałęsa and Yeltsin during the papal visit. A reconciliation between the Polish and Russian nations was then to take place. That was the most far-reaching signal, but I do not know how feasible that idea was. Other signals came too.

Lech Kaczyński The putsch collapsed. The [Polish anti-communist] leadership pondered for several more days the relations between Gorbachev and Yeltsin. Everyone expected a rapid finish for the former. Thus the Belwedera's stubborn adherence to Gorbachev was completely incomprehensible. I also happen to know that [Wałęsa kept] postponing making a telephone call to Yeltsin, despite the pressure exerted by my brother. Technical difficulties were supposedly the obstacle. I do not know whether this is true, but I do know that others had no problem in reaching Yeltsin by telephone.

Jerry Milkowski The president did telephone Yeltsin, for which he was thanked by him afterward. For technical reasons, and also owing to the long list of leaders of many countries who also tried to contact Yeltsin by telephone, the Belwedera was very late in securing that contact, and as for Gorbachev it was unable to reach him at all. Bush and Mitterrand were able to make contact, but other national leaders were not.

Jacek Merkl: I find Wałęsa's conduct "to be unacceptable, unaccountable and unpunishable." I am also opposed to the manner in which Wałęsa represented Poland in his conversation with Yeltsin. When finally, as one of the last national leaders in Europe, he had "succeeded" in reaching the Russian president by telephone, millions of television viewers beheld a sweat-Wałęsa wearing a shirt with the sleeves rolled up and the necktie loosened, with a newspaper lying on the desk and with Wałęska circling behind his armchair and handing him some "urgent" papers to sign. Elementary courtesy toward one's fellow citizens requires that an official and extremely important address be delivered on television under appropriate circumstances.

A Shameful Correspondence

High official at the Chancellery: The absence of consistent treatment of the eastern question resulted in that Wałęsa did not know how to act when the putsch erupted. At the last moment a congratulatory letter to Yanayev was snatched from his hand. He had expected that the putsch would entail major changes and that the SDPR (Social Democracy of the Polish Republic) would become a major political force. He also thought that in being the first to write such a letter he would not lose the initiative. Anyone can make a mistake, but Wałęsa's eastern policy was simply fortuitous.

Jerry Milewski: The president tried to establish contact by telephone with all three, Yeltsin and Gorbachev and Yanayev. I took no part in the discussions of this issue. Insofar as I know the dominant view was that the seizure of power by doctrinaire [communists], the army, and the KGB would be a major threat to our sovereignty. Rassov & co. urged acting with the greatest deliberation. The assessment was that Yanayev should not be justified in thinking that the Polish Government was opposed to him. The president did not speak with Yanayev. I do not know whether a letter was dispatched to him. I was not among the persons who decided on this matter. I have not seen any such letter or its draft. Had I assisted in drafting such a letter, I would opt for excluding the following language: "We are and intend to remain an independent country we have no claims against the USSR, we expect a rapid completion of the negotiations for and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland, the agreements for the shipments of crude petroleum and natural gas will not be broken."

That would not be a letter legitimizing Yanayev. It would provide a kind of political protection against attempts to once again include Poland in the empire were to be restored by the coup plotters, in the event that the coup were to be successful. I believe, however, that no letter was dispatched. Fortunately the putsch collapsed quickly and there was no contact with Yanayev. No such contact could have been possible anyway, considering that the coup plotters were too busy to think of Poland.

Jarosław Kaczyński: I happen to know that during the patch a letter to which President Wałęsa recognized President Yanayev had been written. I believe that it was authored by the president's immediate entourage. Wałęsa declared, "I am acquainted with Yanayev." So is my brother, who met him in the same place as Wałęsa, in Geneva, where Yanayev had represented Soviet workers. In Prague, during the meeting dissolving the Warsaw Pact, my brother Lech was standing in a hallway when Yanayev, then the head of the Russian delegation, stopped him exclaiming, "Oh! Comrade Kaczyński!"

Jacek Merkl: Well-informed sources in the Belvedere tell me that Wałęsa had the letter to Yanayev all ready and was going to dispatch it when, at the last minute, Prime Minister Bielecki personally stopped him from doing so. Had that letter been dispatched, Wałęsa would have found himself in the company of Saddam Hussein and Tymoshenko.

Lech Kaczyński: On 19 August, I learned of the decision to dispatch the letter to Yanayev. I do not know whose idea it was—the president's, his staff, or Minister Wałęska's. This happened shortly after the publicists commented with the detection of passages from Wałęsa's address to NATO in Brussels.

The Gray Eminence

Lech Kaczyński: Initially two versions of the address existed, A and B. One was drafted at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the other enriched with passages inserted by the Presidential Chancellery. I held two meetings with Minister Skubiszewski at which we settled on the final, compromise version received by Wałęsa and transmitted to NATO by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While already in Brussels I learned that confusion reigned among the Polish delegation owing to the existence of both versions A and B. I argued that there was only one version, coordinated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But people from Wałęsa's immediate entourage kept pretending that they did not understand what I was talking about. The point was raised three times. I kept repeating, "Version B does not exist!" At the Belgian Government's residence for official guests Wałęska read version A and declared, "Such an anti-Russian provocation will not be tolerated." The next day I was to travel to the NATO site in the company of the president, but Wałęska, holding the text of the address in his hand, pushed his way inside the car ahead of me. It was then that I noticed that some lines were crossed out. Wałęsa delivered the address, which turned out to be abridged.

High official at the Chancellery: Minister Skubiszewski said that everybody was furious because the printed text of the speech which they received clearly differed from its verbal delivery. High NATO officials complained to us, claiming that they were suspected of having pressured us to delete anti-Soviet accents from the speech.

The passage omitted by Wałęsa was as follows: "But we cannot conceal the truth about Polish-USSR relations—

Edmund: There exist problems which cast a shadow on our cooperation. Despite our efforts and our flexible approach to the negotiations, the withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed in Poland still has not been agreed upon. The USSR is proposing distant deadlines and a slow rate of withdrawal of these troops. Such a policy toward a sovereign Poland is unacceptable. We await a positive turning point which will be important in improving the security climate throughout the continent.

Jerzy Milewski: I believe that Minister Wachowski was instructed by the president to delete this passage. I was not in Brussels during that visit, but I know Wałęsa enough to believe so. Besides, the printed text of the speech that was distributed to reporters did contain that passage, and hence the president was concerned not about deleting it but about assuaging its impact.

Lech Kaczyński: While in the Belvedere, I was unable to shape the president's current defense policy but I still had enough clout to be able to prevent unfortunate ideas and appointments to the rank of general. Several days prior to 19 August, I had objected to the personnel shifts in the command of the special military services because I knew that the new commander would be somehow representing the invisible pathological cliques so adroitly promoted by Minister Wachowski. Once the punch erupted I learned that precisely such an appointment had been made (this concerns Czesław Wąsowicz—Editor). I believe that Minister Wachowski deliberately presented (to Wałęsa) for signing that letter of appointment at a moment when the president sensed the emergence of a threat (from the Moscow putsch).

When I entered the Chancellery last March, Wałęsa entrusted me with drafting proposals for personnel shifts in the armed forces, which was linked to the idea of having the Ministry of National Defense directed by a civilian. Milewski conducted on my behalf dozens of interviews with various higher army officers. I presented our—both structural and personnel—proposals to Wałęsa on about 20 June 1991. At about that time, Wachowski began to visit me and urge me to forget about the idea of a civilian minister of defense, saying that it was a visionary and unfeasible idea. Likewise, Wałęsa began to clearly retreat from championing that idea. We had sharp disputes about it. I was resolved to submit my resignation. A compromise was reached: the minister was to be a civilian but the chief of staff endowed with great powers, was to be a military man. The only meeting of the National Security Council to be held during my short term of office took place on 5 July and it then was held in a tranquil atmosphere.

Jarek Kaczyński: It can be readily imagined what would have happened had Yanayev emerged the victor. In practice, it would have meant loss of control over everything that might be important and decisive at such a time. As known, then communist contacts would have immediately regained their ancient power. Submitting to the influence of people like Admiral Kołodziejczyk

would have led Wałęsa to the threshold of unacceptable decisions—unfortunately I am not at liberty to tell everything—decisions of a military nature, namely overthrow military alliances which would basically strengthen not so much Poland's military standing as the standing of the army in Poland and other postcommunist countries, thereby creating a self-enclaved system which could be potentially always subservient to the central command in Moscow.

Banker's Poker

Jarosław Kaczyński: Speaking of pathological cliques in the Belwedera, mention should be made of Andrzej Kozakiewicz, Wachowski's deputy secretary for economic affairs under the president. In the hierarchy of the three statesmen he clearly ranked at the bottom—after Wachowski and Drzewiecki. In practice he acted as a kind of messenger boy. This Kozakiewicz was a kind of wheeler and dealer. Sometimes even this resulted in comical situations as when, as part of his "friendship" with me, he would tell his clients as follows: "So the bank refused you a loan. Do you know why?" Because Kaczyński told it not to. But you know, this can be arranged, because in reality it is we who hold the upper hand here, not Kaczyński." Of course, all this was news to me, and I have never had any influence on any bank.

I do not understand what it was all about; all I knew was that bankers used to visit Wachowski. He made some kind of deal and the recent appointment of Grodzicki-Waltz (as the director of the National Bank of Poland) proves this. They simply sent out all kinds of signals to the effect that the Presidential Chancellery is the place where various kinds of deals can be arranged. Does this indicate that some big and strategic financial arrangement has been concluded there? Everything indicates that they are not doing it just for fun, but there is no proof.

Janek Merkl: Obviously there exist many much more suitable candidates for the post of chairman of the National Bank of Poland than Mrs. Grodzicki-Waltz, Krzysztof Bielecki, Leżek Balcerowicz, Marek Duszkiewicz—they all have administrative experience and are economists. The first two are well known in the world of finance. They engaged in negotiations abroad, which, given the existing Polish foreign debt, is a highly essential qualification for the bank chairman. I assess the qualification of the new bank chairperson as very low. She has a distinctive perception of the state's financial system through the prism of the need to combat waste rather than to guide this unusually sensitive system. She was personally the coauthor of the presidential veto of the rejection of her nomination.

It is not true that she is a nonpartisan. She is the leader of Victoria, a political party whose main platform is to support Wałęsa and which won about 1,000 votes in the recent parliamentary elections.

Lech Kaczyński: The selection of Mrs. Waltz to direct the National Bank of Poland is part of the logic of the

politics of Minister Wałęsa. No one is questioning her qualifications as an expert on banking law, which are good enough for an adviser. She is a good expert, but that is not enough to manage a bank that employs 9,000 persons and oversees the entire financial system of the nation. I happen to know that she has already received instructions from the Belwedér that have nothing in common with the bank's financial policy.

I fear that, given the mystical attitude of the new Mrs. Chairperson toward the president, her administration of the bank will in practice consist in telephone calls to and from Minister Wałęsa; and his references to "the will of the president." The "telephone state" of work may end badly for the bank itself and for Mrs. Chairperson herself, who has already declared that the president has an exceptional legal status. I do not deny that Wałęsa has a great political impact, but as for his legal status, I do not see also just even a modicum of it. In general, in law is an incomprehensible phenomenon.

Jarek Miekał But it is the mechanism of political action which Wałęsa has been applying, effectively to be sure, that I find most disturbing. As a major factor he accomplished an astonishing feat. He humiliated the Sejm and made of it a laughing stock by securing for himself the future possibility of appointing the prime minister in the same way as he appointed the chairperson of the National Bank of Poland—by submitting repeatedly the nomination of the same person rejected by the Sejm. Since there is a three-month time limit, the president has the power to either force his nominee on the unwilling Sejm or the voter of the commission, despite the Sejm. Now after his encounter with Mr. Wałęsa, Wałęsa knows that the Sejm is more likely to submit to his political designs than to let itself be dismissed.

What Next?

Jarek Miekał At a recent meeting of the National Defense Committee the Polish defense doctrine was discussed. I heard that the president was reluctant to familiarize himself with it, and as to whether the discussion was substantive, let us assume it. I believe that in the long run Wałęsa will not succeed in dissociating himself from the acceptance of responsibility, especially for mistakes committed, while at the same time claiming to himself the credit for right decisions. He has never kept it secret, saying, "Do what you like. If you succeed, I get the medals; if you fail, it is your fault." He says the truth, that a president's job is primarily to take decisions and, what goes with it, to accept responsibility for them.

Józef Raczek Wałęsa may be dangerous to the state, as demonstrated by his recent comments on the need to suspend democracy. I believe that this whole plan [the Belwedér] is nothing but adverse influence on the state. Wałęsa would like to have great powers, and it may be that his role will be complicating, though not

undesired. I believe that Piasecki's strategy of devolving to everything but keeping something aside would not help here.

High official at the Chancellery Wałęsa repeated each week that he would head the disgruntled society, even joking that he himself would march on the Belwedér. He would like to lead any majority that would actually emerge, even if that were a majority during a return to socialism.

For the time being there is no reason to believe that Wałęsa will be able to form an alliance of government factors. He has a chance to survive as a weak president who does not obstruct anyone. He creates international relations and he can coordinate and deliver specifics. He will use, if he keeps alive, as he is doing now, —presenting the Sejm and the prime minister, dissociating the political parties, changing configurations and writing up new ones, thus after another round, the events in Kiszewski's version, it was Michtak or Matuszczyk's solution. It could be somebody else. In this way he is gaining no base of support for himself. He is content like.

In a year perhaps he will submit to a referendum, asking that the citizens do not understand him, that the costs are mounting the rag of war. Therefore, he will ask the people if they want him. If he wins 50 percent of the vote, he will rule with the aid of those régime elements, if he wins less than 50 percent, he will resign. That is a fairly probable alternative. No one will believe that a man like that will resign. But as for me, I think that he is over the constitutional limits. He wants to rule, yet in the same time to want to retire and, that is all, avoid the responsibility like scurvy.

Józef Raczek He would call for a referendum, although I do not think he will do that soon. I am not sure how well he is aware of the circumstances now being left toward him by the régime. On the other hand, this is a relative assessment, because, while the path he outlined makes Wałęsa look bad, there makes the Sejm look good, while a confrontation between the Sejm and the president would not necessarily turn out to be to the advantage of the Sejm.

But how long will the president? As soon as I became head of the F-Association, I used him that he was president pro tempore. The one constitution is not on him, and since it is a road to a will under this name. It may appear that once it is voted, the name of officer of the government will replace, or a step modulus a length, no one can disengage from the spot for all the powers of the head of state, or has a very disadvantageous because one person in the normal procedure. I am then not going to consider anything until the one constitution appears.

Grażyna Górecka Dr. Górecka had a clear and decisive among other things, when the French wrote down "no" at a referendum to simple withdraw its own division of power alone will not be enough for one reason however as a reference.

General Wyszkowski Wałęsa is personally too weak to be a dictator. A dictator is someone who accumulates power and rules by the strength of his muscles and abilities. Wałęsa is incapable of working out a plan of overthrowing. He would not know how. He is too indecisive. On the other hand, a "military dictatorship" is possible. Then Wałęsa would need the assistance of some high-ranking officers of whom he would be total master, e.g., a sufficient prime minister working with a qualified team of ministers. Then the slogan would be simple: enough power to put the life. Now is the time for work. Now is the time for order and consistency, for following a specific direction.

I have lost the confidence in Wałęsa to such an extent that I am beginning seriously to believe that he is manipulating his influence in the army in order to lead us to support. He is supporting old generals, communists, and the 1972 [US-Polish Trade Unions Agreement], and he is the last argument in favor of the communist regime in public life.

Georges Léard Wałęsa will fail a chapter if he supports the majority communists and attempts to influence so as to alleviate its outer terrorism. The worse he could do would be to pursue his personal interests within the government. If he stays away from the coalition, society at least he will live and will further his credibility with a real political force in Poland.

All of the above quotations are authorized.

(See, p. 9)

I Also Asked the Following Persons To Comment:

Secretary of State Mieczysław Wałtroński, chief of cabinet (chief of staff) to the president, Secretary of State

Andrzej Drzewiecki, presidential press spokesman, Secretary of State Lech Wałęsa, who is responsible for legal matters at the Presidential Chancellery, and Minister of State Janusz Zajączkowski, the director of the Presidential Chancellery.

I kept telephoning the telephone office of Minister Wałtroński at average of three times daily for two weeks. Mr. Wałtroński was always either out of office or busy, or receiving visitors, or the line was busy, or he was not in and the secretary did not know where he would be back. The secretary always claimed, "We'll call you back." She never called back. When asked who she answered, "Mr. Wałtroński has not decided yet." Perplexing.

As for Minister Drzewiecki, after many attempts I finally reached him and we had the following conversation on the phone:

"Mr. wałtroński, I'd like to grant you an interview at some time agreed upon. But I am not sure whether I should talk with you. Because of the way you are writing."

"Mr. Wałtroński said that. Do you really want to meet with me?"

"You can put down a No."

As for Professor Lech Wałęsa, he prepared an ad hoc list of questions. After he received them, he declared, "I don't see any point in answering these questions. I am an assistant to the president and not an all-power. You cannot ask me for comments on my book."

Minister Janusz Zajączkowski, too, prepared an ad hoc list of questions. But at otherwise well-bred dinner party going owing to the military drama, I did not think it was a problem.

On Campaign Trail With President Elena

INTERVIEW WITH ADRIAN MIRONESCU, MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN IN ROMANIA / MAY 17 /

(Answer to question 16) To the Press Conference of the National Leader?

(True) He may not yet have decided whether to be a candidate for another term of presidential "dreadge," but Mr. Ion Iliescu is taking long and frequent electoral trips. He is taking the country's pulse. Like the late Aristede, and in the course of negotiations for the formation government of PNL (People's Socialist Party) and PSD (Social Democratic Party)—where the CPDR (Provisional National Unity Front) candidate won 95.99 percent of the votes on 21 May 1980—did better than even Ceausescu—but that doesn't mean he took like a bath in water. An ideal spot to start his campaign had to make sure that he does not betray a socialist-conservative tradition. Mr. Iliescu followed in the footsteps of his predecessor with the presidential campaign. Then he went to the Peasant agricultural movement nation, whose experience has not been very abundant in the past 10 years, while the former CAPS (agricultural production cooperatives) in Peasant and surrounding areas, Prisaca, Chirilova, Dragomireni, etc., were among the most miserable at the mouth of tributaries because the Ceausescu regime closed them down and they were sold two years ago managed by a former Securitate collaborator. He also went to Bihor, Vaslui, a big farm, a couple of factories, and gave two speeches in which, among other things, he communicated with the Americans and with Mr. Bush. What is there to say we could not have been doing better? With evident lack of (an honest diplomatic) difference, Mr. Iliescu attacked—nothing new under the sun—the Communists. As a matter of fact, Mr. Iliescu resulted—for the last many years now!—as unconstitutional monarchs like England, the Netherlands, and Denmark, whose royal houses are related to ours, Belgium, Spain, Luxembourg, Sweden, etc., countries that, more Mr. Iliescu than me can admit, are among the most progressive and democratic in Europe. But no, not Mr. Iliescu, who is either to the Communists or to capital, to flora and fauna, a person and keeps talking about an "absolute system." As if the above-mentioned countries, and we could even include Japan with its emperor had absolute systems! In the presidential campaign—beginning to tell the chronology the people who advise him said for our lives we do not understand why? that an electoral campaign costs more every four years than any civil budget. But the presidential fund, published in an internal official Ministry memo is \$1 million and of millions to and may be augmented without limit at the president's request.

Answers to questions in Vatra and Bistrita avoided her some charged lines of political-religious education.

The series of electoral visits continues. In Iasi there was an evening. He seems to have been well received. He visited—how could he not?—the Jews and the "Judei" from the towns where the Comintern was first

member of the country party committee, Gheorghe Maccarescu (Bucharest), whom over time has already been turned into the a leading figure for leadership and economic growth of a Durch Gott (from God kingdom), as well as the Agricultural Institute and the Peasant. He will also visit in Iasi Pancio, the "little red town" where there is the former July and PRIS (Christian Committee Party); another Southern Peasants' Union, a close acquaintance of Mr. Iliescu from his一开始的 youth. We are looking forward to more cultural events.

Aspects of Political Situation in Cluj Discovered

PNCD Executive Power

INTERVIEW WITH ADRIAN MIRONESCU, MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN IN ROMANIA / MAY 17 /

(Interview with Adrian Mironescu, member of the National Christian Democratic Peasant Party, PNCD, in Catholic Advertisements in Cluj on 4 April: "Romanian National Unity Party Strength (Thus Far Vertical Division in Cluj")

(True) Romanian citizens approach the political scene with more and more interest. Among them is that of Adrian Mironescu who maintained us in so far his attitude there is positive in nature. Religious and clerical people, persons, he has no affiliation. He does not stand in line for the time being, on way to run at the general elections because he did his work besides to write: "But what I want is to live in a free Romania, and I am struggling along that line. I also want to publish a few more books there and abroad, to travel freely, and to live in dignified and comfortable conditions."

Advertisements. When, in fact, is the application of the Constitution and of the unicification of the opposition forces?

(Mironescu) The Christian Democratic Forum was the first organization in the country to launch the principle of uniting the opposition forces. This was the cause of the Constitutionalists, although absolute majority belongs to Mr. Coposu. I think that the Liberals were wrong in their calculations about leaving the Constitutionalists and that they are encouraging Communism. I say that on the basis of the other weak results of the Liberals adhered to the local elections, when they ran together with the Republican Party in Cluj and was not re-elected again. Such right cannot be too encouraging. My view is that the PNCD (National Liberal Party) under power free and voluntary returns to communism just before the Constitutionalists in line for fundamental values of communism attachment, and consider power and political maneuvering a secondary goal. That was the meaning of the last certified. The need to prevent a control from against communism and conservatism.

Advertisements. What role did the UDMR (Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania) play in the Constitutional and in the local elections?

(Marian) Mr. CIOARA had organized lots for journalists, but I strongly suggested Litoa, the candidate of the Communists. That may never have cost Mr. Litoa water along Germany. Mr. Litoa was probably satisfied for having Hungarian relatives that he did not really have. He was accused of having a Hungarian wife (although she comes from Craiova, Romania) and that he wanted to open a Hungarian consulate in Cluj which does not fall under the Mayor's authority. Neither does a Mayor have the authority to open a Hungarian consulate in Cluj, as was attributed to him, nor to reshuffle the facilities for Romanian and Hungarian officials by limiting some and opening others. This advantage was one of the tragic influences TV show regarding some Hungarian in our opinion. An important factor in Minister Latoiu's favor is the effect that the Hungarian government remained itself as the defender of Romanians living outside Hungary. Language communists they said. That was interpreted also as interference in Romania's internal affairs.

(Adrian) Dr. Latoiu believed that it is natural and normal that I (CIOARA) continue as a member of the Hungarian party of Northern Transylvania. Some say that is transforming a strong Romanian into, among people not along ethnic lines.

(Marian) For reasons of ideological and ethnic consistency, we do not accept we should not continue to cooperate with the PSD. I have reason to believe in their truth. They have proven it to a Communist. I cannot approve of the Hungarian Parliament, as my own view, I am toward such ethnic discrimination. I believe in the idea of citizens with equal rights, regardless of ethnic origin.

(Adrian) This is the best idea in the struggle in Cluj?

(Marian) Indeed, in Cluj not otherwise thought as I do. I added that in terms of percentages, the ethnic polarization is still considerable especially among the older and older generation, who will have transnational experience from the time of the Hungarian occupation. The youth is much more indifferent to politics and to such discriminations. Both the Hungarians and the Romanians could care about those issues. However, the West, the press, and so forth, heavier form of the environment is political so that I am an editor of the newspaper "ERED" (ERED is a PSD). We are accused of being the Hungarians' main form of having been brought to the Hungarians what is not true. It is a clear ethnic independence movement. But we are as open as possible. We have published Hungarian authors, too, and that is not wrong for which we are being attacked even by Mr. Pusztai. Our present Mayor, Mr. Latoiu, Hungarian contributing to our newspaper "Baltic Star"! Since they are Romanian citizens, they have a right to express themselves.

(Adrian) Do you think that PSD's Hungarian National Council Party disseminated propaganda in Cluj well to influence at the coming elections, too?

(Marian) Nationalized propaganda appeals to a certain category of people. You see, Cluj has changed both its

social and ethnic composition at the end of the arrival of thousands of Hungarians to work in the ganz factories. Periods afterwards they lost most of the majority ethnic character. The present Hungarian atmosphere of writing and those of international in Maramures and Maramureszoring as their newspaper's position to districts and communities. Their role was decisive for the PSD victory.

(Adrian) To return the better in this meeting Mr. Latoiu, a PSD's former representative for the Democratic Union of the Hungarians, mentioning that made his self to withdraw Hungarianness in the PSD (Democratic Convention) candidate for the Mayor of Cluj was not a very good idea.

(Marian) It is very strange a comment, was not made in the Forum's. It was the decision of the party. But Mr. Latoiu did not. I argued with the writing director and the last moment. But then there was the TV broadcast, in addition to which he came under strong attack in a different Hungarian official Mr. Latoiu was a Hitler who kill in the postwar struggle. But he was not Hitler a candidate as a future candidate for the Mayor or the Chamber of Deputies.

(Adrian) According to your knowledge, the theoretical parties did not do very well in preserving the Hungarians? What is your view?

(Marian) True. The major problem was ethnic colonization. There is a shortage of tens of thousands qualified in non-Hungarians, and the party prone to give seats. For example, PSD (National Christian Democracy, Foreign Party) has three seats nomination. This shows how close to the truth. There could take from them, but the PSD is an essentially poor party. If there is no poor party in Romania, which did not take one dollar (or paid) from anyone. In the PSD (C) it costs no nothing. Hungarian immigrants, who serving communists and working you with Ted Weston, it does not help.

(Adrian) The argument is that it did not sufficiently "representative" itself.

(Marian) The argument was with another, but not with the two Hungarians after the change of language of almost 40 years, and a the absolute majority of the Hungarian population are in their UN's Section Maramures County.

(Adrian) The PSD was also criticized for having accepted Hungarian members from the beginning.

(Marian) I think that a work force was the organization of ethnic party branches, which disappeared after the transition except a group of former Foreign Ministry officials. But then were closed at the last Congress. They are no longer there. The reorganization was carried out during these two years.

[Admission] It is also being said that the PNLDR is influenced in due to Mr. Ciurea and that without Mr. Ciurea the party...

[Question] We are discussing a presentation of the last case. Is it true in the present position in today's Romania?

[Admission] On one hand that the PNLDR was very much involved in the case of our party's chairman.

[Question] PNLDR followed an extremely negative line. The PNLDR however evolved toward a Christian Democratic party, and that may be its true future. This is a new situation being that compared to our Europe. The PNLDR was occupied with full rights over the European Christian Democratic Union. The PNLDR will continue to play the other card of the Hungarian party. It is a party which is without a direction.

[Admission] What are the economic right movements in Romania?

[Question] In the economic right they are including Marian Muresanu's Movements for Economic Change from a non-aligned publication QUARTER DE 1987. Read the motto "Being a Hungarian [from Soviet model] is important but not as pressing as being anti-communist". As long as such positions will continue to be made in Romania you realize that the economic right has begun to go in that direction. That makes us a very important center party.

[Admission] How do you define the PNLDR?

[Question] I view it as a party of local importance. The PNLDR will certainly not exceed throughout the country with the size of a Hungarian party. Its impact is greater in the regions that had been vilified. These regions will gradually make further to oppose possibly return to Hungarian opposition. Look we are the Romanian element from the majority element. The Hungarians probably have their own minority movement groups. Just as there is a German element who doesn't have our to be a "Hungarian" if cases of Greater Hungary". Such phenomena are caused by a Hungarian based extreme measures and of course lack of cultural programs of the open of Romania. As soon as you shift your attention on the citizens, with his rights and duties, rather than on ethnic origin, your elements change. Our Romanian government is not very advanced in Romania. Such undemocratic situations will continue to exist as long as the focus is on ethnicity, on a closed uniform state, on fundamentalist orthodoxy, and on the exclusion of certain religious. For example in Cluj, the Orthodox Church has for two years been discriminated in the open. It used to have the character of Cluj but two years ago was renamed to it. The conflict is not between the Hungarian Church and the Orthodox Church, but between the Hungarian Church and the communist state that substituted its position. This is a matter of giving back property. The Orthodox Church gave back churches in Transylvania and Nagy-Korda to the ecclesiastic political entity and broad area of autonomy of Bishop Commissary, a very old.

[Admission] Now is the position of a few days being still in Cluj?

[Question] It is not like at all. What is left is an organization in Mr. Ciurea's hands and others against him and the independent press. (TDSR has called to Ciurea). He changes his ground that we are publishing Hungarian authors, he also supports the CDUHR which is accused of having no leadership in a Chinese building which is not true. He also demands to not leave from the building and also demands against Hungarian signs. So this is what the PNLDR and its two major line through to Cluj a former Hungarian town. If at present it is not yet another World Government used to control and to create and strengthen unities.

How PNLDR view themselves

[Question] Authors: "A Summary of the PNLDR

Document with the Roman author of TDSR has called to continue discussions in Cluj on 5 April. "Romanian Participation in the Year for the Romanian National Unity Party in Cluj".

[Question] Admissions: Is it true that Dr. Ciurea is now leader and that he belongs to the PNLDR (Romanian National Unity Party)?

[Question] Yes. There are two agents in the last session indicating to be in Cluj. One major task these measure to represent and their courage officials. The major agent is that, in a bid to continue his political program. He has even a manifestation to Hungarian schools and churches in Cluj requesting that their names Hungarian writing from the signs of these institutions.

[Admission] Do you know anything about the fact that the Greek Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church are in the Hungarian Church?

[Question] What was surprising was that the head of the Greek Catholic Church of Cluj, Ms. Lunga commented on the fact of pastoral church confusion. Furthermore, he agreed to not go as independent as the PNLDR but to be in Cluj. Mr. Ciurea had very consistent and approachable Father Lunga tends to himself be persuaded to be not to represent the church, but did not do anything about it.

[Admission] How do you explain the fact that the PNLDR does the church in Cluj?

[Question] The PSD (Social Democratic Front) believed that it was going to lose in the second round. The PSD which had conducted a broad propaganda against the PNLDR, attacking it directly as enough as the CDUHR communists, but a complete falsehood. But an PSD-PNLDR alliance was not enough and the last card had not yet been played. The outcome was decided when the conservative church went with a very great and well-planned front, their unification opposition to the Hungarian culture measure. The day before the second round of elections the two were on the zusammen.

[Question] So Mr. Robert Tănase, did you contribute to the PSD's victory?

[Answer] I am independent. The document was drafted by PSD men. The leader of the PSD was not, but a PSD member wrote it as someone does not make one's name. In any event, it was an impossible task.

[Question] Was the PSD campaign aggressive?

[Answer] Its propaganda was good. It took advantage of nationalist feelings, of those who people of Cluj left after a so-called Hungarian Street, and of those left by the old Hungarian population of Northern Transylvania. In this case, the PSD propagandists emerged from a "shallow" area that had a Central-Eastern European orientation in the electoral campaign. The Anti-Lotta conflict began with some rather harsh exchanges, but the attack was Lotta. Lotta who had a bad record going back to December 1987, where before the anti-Judeo-Romanian law was passed in open fire on the streets. So we see Lotta Author a correspondingly concerned about attacking it ethnic and Germans in which the other has to become, namely, a policy. We found a massive agreement for the PSD and PDS. As far as we know, that did not happen elsewhere, to which the current situation.

[Question] So, who voted for the PSD? People with a secondary education, like the census shows?

[Answer] Did Cluj voted for the Communists. The fact that was agreed in favor of the PSD in the new districts (Maramureş, Maramureş) there can, we can speculate about lack of political awareness and education. People here are more entrepreneurial and the effect of those of the Hungarian minority's existence, well explained by the PSD, played a decisive role. During the first round of elections, abstention was very high until 1989, when some cases of Hungarians voting found in Satu Mare and when thousands of people from Maramureş, who had not intended to vote, went off to vote. After all, voting is a civic action. Then however, came under the influence of a report that in the end turned out to have been false. The statement was spread out on television, so everyone was involved in the voting in Cluj.

[Question] How did the alliance with the UDNR (Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania) fit in the elections?

[Answer] The alliance with the UDNR was right. If there were abstention, then had to do with an insufficient willingness to organize on the part of the UDNR. Of course, everyone knew that if one went with the UDNR one could not have voter support, but one could work on another plane, in another arena. Both the Communists and the PSD made mistakes. At one point the propagandist was created that the UDNR had joined him with the

PSD more or less. This was an advertising strategy, which they have been captured by the opposition press. But it is not enough to begin to organize in an electoral campaign.

[Question] So what goes in their election at the D and the UDNR working together?

[Answer] The objectives are the same. The Hungarians did not have a candidate for mayor, having considerably supported the UDNR candidate. They intend to be supported in the places where they had both candidates and not Cluj. It seems that they were supported, but not in the same measure as they supported the Communists. They were forced to the point of making mistakes and losing votes. Out of truth, they used calculations for new conflicts, thus collecting a few thousand ballot. Well, it is hard enough to influence a public.

[Question] You have a complicated strategy for working together.

[Answer] Yes, it is very complicated and it will become even more so because of the liberal game. The UDNR has a big advantage considering the number of Hungarians in the region, while for us a German according to UDNR party is very difficult. We also know how many people voted for the PSD, the PSD Alliance Party, how many for the Liberal, and how many for the Popular Party. We know how many voted for the Communists, how many for the PSD, the UDNR, and the PVN. Another piece of information we have is that in several areas the PSD were alone and won 100% votes for the entire country, which was a catastrophe. Once again the Communists appeared as a better position.

[Question] If you had the power to set the date for the elections, when would then be held?

[Answer] In June. The general election should be held separately from the presidential. I think that the PSD people will be better and more convincing and that the ones for Parliament will be entirely different from the ones in the local elections. I hope that the international factor will take a prominent place. That is the conclusion reached at the last.

[Question] What is the PSD situation in Cluj?

[Answer] One of the famous cases in Cluj was that of the local Stănescu. He was Stănescu's right hand in the PSD. Leader of the communist Youth, where Stănescu was chairman of youth and women's general of the PSD. On 1 December he was at the Cluj Roman Machado's residence, where he had been sent by the party committee. He stated looked up in Stănescu with Vilmos Petrescu, the future mayor of Cluj, who apparently tried to keep the workers from leaving the committee. You can in the committee that also in the event with Stănescu and Petrescu were in the PSD, after the event Stănescu, the head of the party committee was accepted. A few days later, I.A. Stănescu was called back to show people how a master worked (he had been

responsibility for the economic situation and the future. On top of that, one week he was summoned to Bucharest, apparently by Ion Iliescu. Since then he has not been consulted and uninvited. But then he transferred over to the Eastern wing. Locally, he PNL is represented by Petruțe Lunguș Zăiu, a former professor of Marxism at the university, who represents the Second wing, a Plutonium for Romania.

Hungarian Schools Dissemination

QUESTION Bucharest, 27.5.1992 (in Romanian) "May 4?"
"A"

[Interview with Csaba Székelyán, member of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, in Budapest Administration in Cluj on 5 April: "A Strategy Familiar From the Times of the Dictatorship"]

[Csékelyán] In a speech being held that Day has a vice mayor who belongs to the PSD (Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania).

[Székelyán] It is still a certain distance that must be travelled towards democracy, but the personal opinions, a kind of leadership by decree.

[Adalbertová] Are there any Hungarian-language schools, or not? Mayor Fodor said that there are only Hungarian schools that are also attended by Romanians.

[Székelyán] That, in fact, is true since people have a memory that the Education Law of the government had that regulation such matters did not encourage schools in which the working language is Hungarian. But such schools do exist in the Hungarian, Crimea, and other countries. Last summer there was a scandal in Cluj about such schools and there will probably be another one after the break. They have two high schools in which the working language is Hungarian, although they have Romanian teachers, one and some subjects (such as geography) are taught in Romanian. The Constitution guarantees the right to be educated in the Hungarian language. There is no education bill on, so these high schools operate without exactly legal grounds for existing. In fact, it is not morally clear who is responsible for the organization of these high schools. If they are subordinated to the Education Ministry, then the local authorities have no right to interfere in the matter. If they are a part of the local autonomy of the regions or of the respective regions, then indeed the mayor has a right to make decisions on the matter. The professors are non-experts, because the government is issuing decisions regarding the high schools, which are implemented through the Education Ministry instruments that the building in which these high schools are located are not the usual public administration, and the theory was that the does not have sufficient space to allow such students to study in the mother tongue. This was the, in fact, reason in the central management of such high schools, including the Hungarian ones. Thus, under the pressure that the law to guarantee the students' education in the

Romanian language, the means to establish Hungarian-language classes in the buildings of the Hungarian-language high schools. In fact, to ensure the old exists of mixed high schools, like under the dictatorship. He means to use this strategy in the democratic Re-institution and then even education in the Hungarian or any other language.

[Adalbertová] Is that why he is eliminating bilingual signs?

[Székelyán] Precisely. The sign shows that in the building is located an institution that teaches in the Hungarian language. By removing the sign and giving the school just a number, all the schools are made equal and placed under his jurisdiction. He worked a similar from the time of the Dictatorship. The "one is" phenomenon shows that those more or practicing this strategy are to let the people that will be during the Dictatorship to their function.

Name on CD-ROM Solutions

QUESTION Bucharest, 27.5.1992 (in Romanian) "May 4?"
"A"

[Interview with Géza Székely, Director of Institute of Hungarian in Romania, Bucharest, in Budapest Administration in Cluj on 5 April: "We Still Support our Democratic Coalition"]

[Csékelyán] Géza Székely is also one of the experts that organize Romanian-Hungarian has contributed to Romanian policies. He is also subject to the call of autonomy, always in relation to the disapprovement culture in the political life originally ours.

[Adalbertová] What can we tell us about the importance of the local autonomy?

[Székelyán] The almost unanimous conclusion is that the cities with the replaced the political role in Transylvania or in Northern Transylvania. The question is whether a different strategy or different principles of cooperation (or disapprovement) would have avoided better results for the autonomy. There are various considerations according to which even if we had organized majority (in the sense that the autonomy could not come to expression, or we were not able to fully potential Hungarian minority and autonomy), contributes the overall balance of the cooperation was very positive. I think that this is underlying factors. What is not denied, but still cause a wide coalition could be an implement detail, I hope in that situation, if correct place, our voice get the impression that their participation was with representation, meaning in politics. More specifically, our voice were weak, but at least we had the impression that the voice was not really true for our candidate and our participation. We had candidates on the Convention last, but I was referring to cases in which approximately 40 percent of a city's population was officially Hungarian. Our candidate was not accepted on the grounds that the Hungarian community

will not vote for a Hungarian draft of the Hungarian or quantum had the official support of the EEC (Eurocommunist Conference). That is in fact what happened in Madrid. However, we think that the compromise was beneficial and that it is the only possibility. Still, if someone should emerge because of our participation, we can start another strategy, one of complete separate evolution. We will definitely support any democratic movement even if we do not participate in the government. Our demands, which without regard to us also call for the Communist's candidate for the President, we will support him instead of anyone provided he is not Mr. Ceausescu.

(Admission) Do you still intend to abandon government?

(Borsig) It is both a matter of logic and legitimacy. After being compromised and influenced, I was presented to the Romanian public as an extremist and a dissident, a communist, which I am not. Unfortunately because I am a part, this a possible bridge between the two cultures has also disappeared. Because the work of others is one means of representation between the other communities between two nations. I understand my work, which could have served the purpose of such representation, was for a while compromised because I am no longer viewed as a part, but as a dissident. This is in view of the conditions. I then, to cover over for the UDMR (Eurocommunist Union of Hungarians in Romania), at this time in Madrid, in the extreme viewed as an extremist. Of course, in theory, in four months the new UDMR leadership will also be described as such, as being extremist. But perhaps enough time will have passed until then for the Romanian society to understand that a UDMR leader is not necessarily a dissident or an extremist.

(Admission) Do you think that recent news of your statements were slightly ambiguous?

(Borsig) No, they certainly were not. But whatever I said, they were interpreted that I was anti and antiextremist, regardless of who I was. For example, once I was writing about eastern Hungary. My statement was immediately interpreted to mean that I was talking about Transylvanian Eastern Hungary, a very frequently used term for the eastern parts of Hungary. Nevertheless, in several articles that appeared was interpreted to mean that "there is referring to Transylvanian Eastern Hungary." There are thousands of such marginal. I was never ambiguous or confusing, but in fact I think this can be demonstrated. I am asked all the public questions, answers, or discussions. Recently I was in Yugoslavia, where I talked about the political situation in Romania and about our situation, and once again I was presented as an extremist who was promoting the good relations between the two countries. I suggest that the text be published and analyzed.

(Admission) What will the UDMR look like if you and Mr. Gheorghe Dragomir quit its leadership position?

(Borsig) I would like to continue to serve although I can. But the fact I do not have to build a leadership position. If I have any influence and prestige, I will have them over without any pose. We hope to be able to create a new institution capable of operating on the basis of a clear principle. So we may not have with permanent personnel in the long future, but perhaps this future will be more favorable for the Hungarian leaders, communists who will be able to negotiate among themselves. But if there will be a need for politicians, we to speak for government positions, or if the position will be needed an alternative government, in one or two years, or whenever, I will perhaps consider returning to the demand expressed by me. I almost myself to be exiled because as a citizen of East Germany had such political ambitions.

Criticism of New Movement-Led Party Line

ADAMUSZ BAKHORN: *Europäische Rundschau*, Berlin
4 May 1989

(Interview with magazine Ochi Brum to criticize Băsescu and other former dissidents and their new group "Nationalism and Freedoms")

(Text) (BAKHORN ADAMUSZ) Mr. Băsescu and the bulk of Băsescu after leaving during a period of agitation before the elections. How do you see the current political scene, the new parties that have arisen such as the Movement for Romania?

(Băsescu) The political influence underground yesterday in Romania. I am convinced in the case of the formation of this coalition is a that who, if we are to trust logic and consequence should be the first to realize how important is especially now to establish a coalition of political forces in Romania. The emergence of new political organizations indicates that the 25 million residents with in Romania have not yet been created a phenomenon which I considered normal until now and a half year ago, but now I consider with these people do not fit to join the already existing parties. Using their political and social bases, to form create a majority of the political party, they prefer and oppose the political line they consider appropriate. It seems to me that to expect the role of the Constitutional Court with the organization of new parties is a waste of public funds in a country in which I am inclined to say should not exist. However, the Movement for Romania has drawn attention among the newly emerging parties and I could say that I have now come to Romania because I consider the creation of the political organization as a signal, a cognitive signal underground, which has also been perceived in the West and which contributes obviously nothing to the accomplishment of Romania's general objective of creating Europe. Why do I say this? Because on a continent which is definitively heading toward the formation of the United States of Europe, no nationalist ideology has a chance, particularly if it generated in nationalism. Marian Miculescu would

probably expected by saying that we are experiencing a rebirth of national movements in Europe, and on the surface, that is so.

(BAILE A.D.A.) It might be useful to have a few lines about the national movements here and abroad.

(Băsescu) If one just looks at the surface, therefore, I should say it is right, but some analysis will show that the premises for the national movements that are currently rather prevalent in Europe are markedly different from the nationalism. I might say general, that we can find in Romania, in which the Movement for Romania enter basically feelings. What is that difference? Whereas these national movements in West Europe are manifested by a normal migration of emigrants from throughout the world, in Romania, the strongest effect of nationalism leads us to an attitude against potential emigrants who will do not cross, and thus against those outside Romania. The national movements in West Europe are in fact a political effect of manpower distribution. Let me be more explicit. The number of emigrants that are allowed to come into West European countries is apportioned as a function of the percentage allocated to these national partners, the maximum amount of work is presently needed following the entry of the former GDR into the Common Market, the plans to develop southern Italy, Portugal, southern Spain, Greece, and so on. There are development projects that have been conceived for decades, which can now be implemented, and which now require an immense amount of labor. Western politicians of course realize that they must enact a series of programs to control the situation, and thus reduce these national movements to fit the pulse of the population. The moment these movements affect 15 percent, they immediately reduce the number of emigrants, and as I have argued for several years, the electoral percentage achieved by these parties drop to about 1, 4, or 5 percent, which is insignificant. At the same time in this country, a new organization, which we can see is rather anti-emigrating, wants to gain substantial percentages in the next election using arguments which in my opinion are justified for 1992, in light of the imminent creation of the United States of Europe.

(BAILE A.D.A.) Mănescu said that he was strongly counting on the Discreted youth whose numbers could reach nearly 1 million, many of whom did not even come forward at the last elections.

(Băsescu) If I were Mănescu, I would avoid having the realization of a political program on a multitude of discreted people. The task to unify one thing, the procedure institutionalization of the political process that the specific organization wants to impose. What is more, given Mănescu's stand, I believe he should have realized that members of political organizations that have already found a congenital niche would be much more efficient. I think that the identification with PNCD (National Front Christian Democratic Party) claimed by Mănescu is evidence of the urgent problems that will affect the Movement for Romania, in which case he

has certainly suffered the maximum possible set through that statement. Whether it was to the advantage of the Movement for Romania remains to be seen, but I think was to the disadvantage of the PNCD. I am also aware how delighted PNCD members were to hear that they are allied with a political movement which is now according to Mănescu's statements, a disorganized crowd of leftists merged at the beginning of the year. I have heard comments regarding your supporters' alliance with Mănescu, to estimate that aspects of such the position of the Movement for Romania. We are dealing with an organization that we should certainly avoid, to bring as a birth a sort capable of demonstrating organizational coherence and clear policy. It must eliminate all threats that something a superficial left is not even talk about Mănescu's statements, which in my opinion are completely wronghead in assessing the present condition of the Romanian nation. And here at the heading of the outcome, the first one was direct statement: "Some demands in the integration with the Romanian nation." For the others from the so-called right, to change Mănescu's political opinions. But the moment one wants to conduct political action in a democratic society, it is impossible to ignore, because that a political direction is inappropriate. I would have preferred myself to consider the present situation of each one person in 20 millions, if a single person in a considered social direction, a right that social direction is compatible with the Romanian nation. I am not a social democrat, I don't fully share that ideology, but as I argue it is a pluralistic democracy means that I would advocate the one democratic belief, that I would become a democrat.

(BAILE A.D.A.) You have not avoided any party and from the type not represented any political power, comprising an independent until now.

(Băsescu) I wouldn't argue a political option in Dr. Mănescu, but an option who had clarified up the nature of the strength of his influence on their right of society, prohibited the from being it to a Romanian citizen to be the first element that was freely held on Romania and. The study the issue about what came over and, and perhaps among him I would say that a Romanian promoted the from being a Romanian. But to go on with Mănescu: "There is no other national destiny than Romania". Completely is an individual opinion author. The moment is used to organize a multitude of people in Mănescu probably would like to do their Christianity changes from gentle to dangerous, but as the bringer of God's name in fundamental organizations, or as you call person the propagator to our God according to his nature, his character, and his customs. I was shocked by another of Mănescu's statements, when he said that the Legionaries were a Romanian army over the country supported them. I will draw Mănescu's attention to the fact that until 1989 except for a single person, a man, an other option also supported Nicolae Ceausescu. I would therefore ask Mănescu whether considering that Ceausescu did was also Romanian?

Intergen Pro-Design, Leadership in color!™

William Dr. Carl Mowry "The Bungee Maniac"
From Texas

Long, Dr. MILA Rumanian Ecological Movement
congratulated the parliament that the terms of its founding
assured right after the resolution. But what is left now
more than two years later of the free resolution of that
date? The great law that adorns the movement's seal was
in the process of changing its symbols presented to the
exactly that Mr. Ceausescu wanted to do away in Romania,
while the M.R.E. in practice showed its concern to "Build
Ecology as a Poor Country at a Poor World".

The Second World War when Tomo George Macmillan started the appeal to found the movement. People of all ages attracted to the policies of the singer "A Fine Man is a Fine Citizen in a Fine World" began to work in their support. The first meeting was held at Eaton Hall, one which over 1,000 people attended including Douglas Deller, a professor at the Polytechnic, lecturer, the stage manager Senator Constantino Scamone, Dr. Bernardino Gómez, the entrepreneur Ernesto Pernas, the painter Mariano Roldán and Señor Gutiérrez, president of the Association. From a temporary management committee was elected with Tomo George Macmillan as chairman. But at back of them was the enthusiasm of many people who aided their efforts, some of them even becoming designated by appointment to the M.E.R. Section like C. Gutiérrez, M. Clegg & A. Tavárez, will not be found at the M.E.R. Congress but without their efforts support the results on 20 May would have been entirely different and perhaps the Douglas Deller would have held these discussions and press in Chicago Park. The departure of these young leaders, who face the whole frontier and with the urge were to Parliament began right after the election, is a clear guide for that the people are always working. To what further good changed the King (Alfonso) over the rock "Bernardino Romeo" and the knight "Burgos" have said them?

The results on Blood兄弟 were not the strongest nor of even moderate power. The main power took over a negative correlation with the Intensity, occurring later with the two variables out of long separation and the second was not long in returning the building of the family system, the further transformation of the P.T.B. Nottingham Corporation Party, inflation of about million or not at least tenth, a black station wagon and a new residence at 6870 at which Dennis Tolosa (IP gubernatorial candidate) made his. The strongest publications (PTB) was founded in the winter period, and afterwards King Marcos, after breaking the marriage, now had a woman of honour for his partner abroad (PTB) did not have very long under his management, although it started out under the previous regime as a man from Marcos' friend. Other

I have also mentioned the new Headquarters, let me now bring a detailed narrative that I was turned over to the W.M.B. with its complete structure including, the party's Secretary Mr. Wilson Palms, then our president of the Wm. B. took care to make Ansorge one of them for the election. When the affair began to wind, the expenses mounting he had gone to Washington a vice-chairman of the United States offered by the W.M.B. Society for Service of Displaced who had come at the time of Paul V. Strzelecki presented on the U.S.A. as the other. As we all very well know the United States is an attractive country so that it is to consider that the blacksmith Palms organized political meetings like a living today in a dead country in a dead world.

These were stored in Burkina Faso to conserve them until enough time matured. The aid that came from France and was distributed through the M.I.E. to the children in the area is going to be sold on the open market. The French Ecological Party brought to help to build a Burkina and will then enter into negotiations. Through the positive management of these funds, the economic advantage of the M.I.E. is reflected in Ecological Economics. The source of M.I.E. money is as follows:

From Switzerland a strong provocation came from the managers of L'Oréal who told Mr. Jean Monnet that he "should not be provoked at all". While on an economic trip through France, he reported to the IBM International Marketing Department that European growth was stalled and the money must be collected in France. But the Swiss had reported a 4% of the sales figure of Europe. What happened was IBM to IBM at "friendly" congressional dinner. The country did not know longer that the "European Bank" entity used to be an illegal establishment that was called "the because of a very European response. The company of the firm in making decisions of importance to the Ministry of Finance was another one of its functions. And then coming of the Mr. L'Oréalism founded the "Group of Economic and Social Thinking" through which he was able to obtain a subsidy of \$10,000 from L'Oréal. Mr. Monnet did not agree to the idea and suggested a "The underlying motive for the subsidy was also "malignant". There was no future plan for blocking the trade programs of the East European states.

The youth-entrepreneur can and hangs in the **WEDD** a
magazine of Texas College, Marana, where his name
is Texas Mayor, a graduate of the cosmopolitan Marana
Community College. Douglas D. Dickey, who was
interested after the circulation by his former students at
TCC and has Texas former chairman of the petition
committee of the C.I. of the U.S. Central Committee of the
League of Communists, V. north.

The cell began with the letter after the month appeared at the NLLB at 1981 as an economic administrator. Having been chosen by the president of the organization with the PVA, National Economic Power Structure, it

becoming undersecretary of state in the future Ministry of Public Administration. He would also have liked to be mayor of Bucharest. With no higher education, he became a constructor in sector 1 (supported by the French), which often he obtained by falsifying public documents, declaring on his candidate's card that he is an engineer. He was nominated after as executive director of MIR and delegate to missions with ROMPRES. He represents the movement in discussions with the government and in contacts with foreign delegations. Although he did not and does not have any kind of mandate to represent the Executive Managing Committee, he was the representative of the MIR in the intelligence courses of the Council for Defense of Romania, which are given at the Military Academy. As a pro-dignitary of the movement, he controls correspondents, arranges trips abroad and in perfect Securitate style, has all telephones monitored. Bogdan Traian has two passports, one Romanian and one Israeli. What does he actually represent?

In any case, he has represented Tomo George Marinescu when he obtained a villa for him at 31 Kneiphoff Street, opposite the embassy of the state where he studied USSR. He probably learned about the market economy in those Moscowite circles, and now he is managing a foreign trade firm jointly with a French citizen of Romano origin (Bogdan). You can buy your perlusses, camomiles and water, all ecological, at the Cine store on Magheru Boulevard.

But the big ecological business belongs to Detlef Dresner with his private attorney. He conducts his activity today in over 22 offices in Bucharest and has a part of the MIR's headquarter. As the man the Marinescu-Dresner team operated perfectly, the latter providing financial aid for the newspaper ECO and for MIR. Instead of that, the Ecological University received offices through the movement's influence and technical equipment out of the donations for the MIR. When some representatives proposed at the Managing Committee that the attorney becomes a joint-stock company with the majority held by the MIR, Mr. Dresner argued as if burned. Was such a thing possible? Should he lose his so profitable position and annual turnover of more than 60 million lei, without benefiting to cover the collections of foreign exchange from the foreign visitors? Mr. Dresner's promises are still strong, and he even uses the movement's money code.

But the ecological crusade went on. Michael Drappier of the Executive Managing Committee Dresner nominated himself as undersecretary of state in the National Committee on Recycling Waste. The business was an "international" as it was in the case of the Ecological University. A fact he could be obtained if that committee agreed to the building of a plant to burn wastes brought in from the West. What could be more hideous on the part of an ecological leader than the motto consisting of importing refuse "in a clean country in a clean world"? It was not to be, but we do not think Mr. Dresner is encouraged. Household wastes did not work, but he can still try to import glass or plutonium,

both of which products will make the ecological price increase on the campus of Dinu-Maria University.

We have every respect for Mr. Marian Bratu, but we cannot overlook a number of troubling questions. Since he became head of the Ministry of Environment, we would have expected to see better results. What has he done so far? He does not want to care that the law on environmental protection has not been approved. He is not concerned that the country should learn the degree of pollution of Isaccea or the truth about the deterioration of its forest. Unfortunately Mr. Bratu has sparked a wildfire. The wood is going to the West, that is to Hungary, Austria, or Germany, and what does it matter that the Romanians will no longer have forests? What has Mr. Bratu done for the Danube Delta, Zimra or Copălău Mică? Vice-president of the MIR, a senator, a professor and dean of the Faculty of Natural Sciences at the Ecological University, he seems to be aiming now at the Presidency of the country. Once he became a minister, Mr. Bratu did not shrink from giving up his post as a senator, and as a result the MIR is no longer represented in the highest forum in the land.

The firm Tezcan, sponsored by Ion Toma and managed by his partner one Raben, is another point of ecological in Romania. The object of its activity is the sale of Romanian version, specially prepared on Gheorghiu's former reservations. The representatives of the firm bring of their highly placed connections, to the point of maintaining that they facilitated the installation of an international telephone in the office of Minister Marian Bratu, who could have blocked the contracts of that firm that were disastrous to the country.

There would be just as much to say about the other ecologists, but we do not want to repeat ourselves. In them are points of dwelling on Mr. George Scutaru who was in the presidium of the congress on its second day in operation. He is just small by comparison with Adolf Dresner. He only founded the famous ecological ecological firm, thus violating Article 7 of the MIR's charter which sanctions "persons who would try to sanctify their personal aims through the instrumentality of it."

Admiralina Renu is a scientist and by no means a person to be pleased by the way Dresner used her to obtain official recognition of the Ecological University from the Minister of Education (after he is a university of many of their students).

Mrs. Octavia Corescu Renu cannot argue with the fact in the MIR being in the same position as Mr. Săpărăna that a well informed but powerless against the Marinescu-Bratu crew. Mr. Octavian Corescu is supported with by a broad group, although he fights for the advancement of the MIR. He does not wish to have any political forum, after his activities at the French has always oscillated according to the word was hearing on the Managing Committee.

Cornel Rauta is one of the few about whom we have nothing adverse to mention. United by Măruțescu and Drămer because of the frankness with which he raises questions directly and unequivocally, he has risen through his professionalism, sense of organization and ability to make decisions.

These are approximately the people, character or distinct who are managing the MDR. The answers to many questions that the movement has been evading for more than two years depend upon this congress, as well as the role that it will play or not play on the Romanian political scene.

Treatment of Ethnic Germans Called Unjust

978-0-8420-1414-4 Bucharest ADEVĂRUL in Romania
21 Apr 92 pp 1-2

[Open letter, dated 4 April, from representatives of the German Democratic Forum to Romanian officials and German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher—first paragraph is ADEVĂRUL introduction]

[Text] Everyone is familiar with Anghelescu's joke... because we don't have Germans...) More than once we have had an opportunity to note that we did "have" Germans, but did not know how to "keep" them. One very logical and partially conclusive example is offered by the attached open letter which, having come to the end of their letter, representatives of the German Democratic Forum extricated us for the unfortunate purpose of giving a irrefutable publicity.

Sibiu, 4 April 1992

To His Excellency Ion Iliescu, president of Romania
His Excellency T. Stoilescu, prime minister
Mr. Măruțescu, minister of agriculture
Mr. Grigorescu, minister
Ministers Dorel Viorel Urea and T. Vaida, secretaries of state

Recently we have been receiving a growing number of reports, charts, and complaints from Romanian citizens of German nationality regarding aspects of a gross social and national injustice and flagrant violations of the law especially in the implementation of Law No. 18/1991.

The people directly and immensely deprived of their legal rights and those who learned of such situations constantly pressed us to entreat the competent bodies to defend and restore legality, and to inform the public of the country and abroad about what has been occurring.

They asked us to appeal to all the forces that may intervene to ensure that this ethnic group, so harshly tried in the past, frequently only because of its ethnicity, does not endure fresh injustice and hardship precisely at this time, when Romania has also won its freedom and is aspiring to join the European common house and when in official documents it is asserting the validity of the ethnic Germans in Romania.

Any delay in resolving the following problems will shatter our faith in the benevolent declarations made by Romanian officials regarding the ethnic Germans and the wish and ability to achieve a law-governed state in Romania, and may lead to serious conflicts unacceptable to us.

1. a) More than one year after the passing of Law No. 18/1991, and more to 10 months since the issue of "certificates," less than 10 percent of the land has been distributed in a very large number of communes in Transylvania, and much less than that to ethnic Germans (for example, in the Brasov suburb of Bartolomeu none of the 77 hectares has been distributed; 280 hectares out of 460 have not been distributed in the Hărău commune, Brașov County; 100 hectares out of 150 remained undistributed in Moșna, Sibiu County). For this reason, in 1991 people were unable to use in any way their ownership rights over the land allocated to law and confirmed by a certificate, thus they were unable to carry out the fall sowing, which means that there will be no grain to harvest for bread, they will not be able to sow the spring crops (spring wheat, double barley), and should there be further delays in distributing the land, they risk losing any means of cultivating anything in 1992.

After frequent endeavours at city halls, commune members and mayors have been telling them: "The seasons come later," "Let's see if there is any land left" (for example in Moșna, Igrișu Nou, Racoș, all in Sibiu County, etc.) while these citizens received the land to which they were entitled, usually where they wanted it so that what is left for "later" is stumps, hillocks, and the plots furthest away from the commune (for example Dacia and Ticușu Veche, Brașov County).

b) In some localities, at the instance of the inhabitants, in the fall of 1991 the communal councils distributed approximately 30 percent of the land so that the fall sowing could be done, while the remaining plots were to be allocated to the beginning of spring 1992. The owners carried out agricultural work on the plots distributed (fall plowing, sowing, fertilizer treatments), but now, in the beginning of spring, the newly elected mayors have canceled the fall distributions, have replaced members of the communal committees, and have allocated the same plots of land to others, so that now there are new owners for the same land.

Humiliated, threatened, but trusting in the force of the law rather than of the fact, ethnic Germans are suffering with pain, worry and sometimes disappointment and resignation, how stakes and other land marks are appearing in the wheat they sowed and the beds they plowed, how others are sowing the fields they prepared and they wonder who will harvest what they sowed (for example in Moșna, Igrișu Nou, Sibiu County, Hunedoara, Brașov County, and so forth).

c) We view as absolutely unacceptable the attempt to allocate land to ethnic Germans on the borders of

localities other than those of their residence, inhabited by Romanians or Hungarians, on the grounds that no land was left in their localities of residence (as in the Harchia commune, Brasov County). Note that in their centuries-long history the Transylvanian Saxons never deprived any other nationality of its land.

d) We believe that summoning only the ethnic Germans to town halls to bring additional proof of ownership—and that not in the spring of 1991, but in the spring of 1992, after the stage of verifications and reports was over, after the terms of appeal had expired and been resolved, after documents had been validated by the county commissions and ownership certificates had been issued—is an illegal, abusive act of intimidation of the ethnic Germans (example: Sighetu Brasov).

e) The refusal to allocate land on grounds that "they or their parents belonged to the ethnic German group" (example: Rusa Montana, Abred, Alba County), situations in which, although they requested land, they received certificates and are denied possession and sent to IAS (state agricultural enterprises) to buy shares, the illegal allocation of only 0.5 hectares per family, the fact that the suit filed with the Deva Court continues to be postponed while the land distribution is nearing its end (Aurel Vlaicu commune, Hunedoara County), constitute additional irregularities in the implementation of Law No. 18/1991.

f) At the same time, we protest the refusal of some city halls to award possession or IAS managements to persons who have certificates—which means that their ownership right was recognized—on grounds that they are about to emigrate or have emigrated and left power of attorney to children, relatives, or friends and will dispose of the property as soon as possession has been taken, within the legal period of time (communes Sighetu and Harman, Brasov County; Moisa, Sibiu County).

We protest the cuts in the plots of land due to the churches in accordance with Article 21 of Law No. 18/1991 (Buc, Alba County; Sighetu, Brasov County), or the refusal to award possession, although certificates were issued and shares were requested from the IAS, which in their turn also refused them (Geagau commune).

II. In very many situations, (certified) land owners did not receive any of the crops harvested in 1991 on their land. For example from 426 hectares in the Harman commune, Brasov County, 216 hectares in Sighetu, Brasov; 150 hectares in Moisa, Sibiu; 408 hectares in Nou Salenc/Sibiu, and 108 hectares in Nemşa, Sibiu.

III. In most situations, the 40-percent credit awarded for the land used by cooperatives was not distributed. Examples: Harman, Sighetu, etc., Brasov County; Aref, Bistritza, Moisa, etc., Sibiu County, and in other counties.

IV. The cases listed above do not exhaust the range of negative aspects in the implementation of Law No.

18/1991 to the detriment of ethnic Germans, nor the localities in which they are occurring, but they may be seen as significant examples designed to persuade you that measures have to be taken to ensure that the laws that are passed are also implemented. The fact of belonging to a minority must certainly not affect the obligation to equally apply the law to all the country's citizens.

We request your intervention to redress the mistakes made willingly or unwillingly and to prevent a repetition of such mistakes.

First, however, we request that this group of citizens of the country also receive the land to which they are entitled, of an equal quality to that of the other citizens in their communities.

We demand that measures be taken to eliminate the tendencies to delay and intimidate and insults and labeling such as "Hitlers," "Nazis," etc., to which people are subjected when they press the local bodies to respect their rights.

We believe that all the state bodies, at all levels, are obligated to intervene when they find law violations, for as this is a basic condition for continuing our efforts to engage as loyal citizens in the country in which we were born and for turning to good account for the country the many opportunities offered presently by our nationality.

[Signed] Professor Ingmar Brandich, parliament deputy
Hugo Schneider, economic department head

Ed. note: One copy of this letter was sent by the signatories to Mr. Genscher. We want to congratulate the ethnic or dialethic majorities in the localities listed or not listed in the memorandum for their wonderful contribution to supporting the foreign policy of the Romanian state and for confirming Romania in the world as a land of abuse, robbery, and injustice. We also want to congratulate the honorable prefects of the counties in question and all the gentlemen and ladies who, having the authority to deal with such situations, did not even in passing wonder what it would have been like to have suffered, during the period of establishment of totalitarianism in Romania, even one fraction of what the ethnic Germans suffered for the simple fact of being "Germans."

Stolcean's Report on State of Economy Discussed

9/8.0106948 Bucharest 4/1 in Romanian / May 92 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Half a Year of Stolcean"]

[Text] The latest Stolcean report featured a synthesis of the achievements of the team installed after the September raid of the miners, the measures viewed as indispensable to consolidate the national economy, the manner in which they can be implemented while at the same time protecting the public's incomes, and the

decisions regarding the 1991 budget law or subsidies for certain products and services.

The Socialist government had until now pursued inflationary. To organize free and honest local parliamentary and presidential elections.

—The local elections were viewed as positive and as marking the beginning of a real reform of the institutions and structures of local government.

—There is no real chance that the parliamentary and presidential elections should not be held by the end of June 1992.

—The general economic situation was viewed as necessary, in condition that their activities be directed by private rules.

—The primary economic objective pursued by the present governmental team regards the continuation of the economic and social reforms, the only limits of which conditions can be imposed by different planning the measures of the society.

Noting that the main labor analysis cannot simply be implemented can be the case of the current privatization model, the government sought to review as much as possible the operation of certain industries and mechanisms of the market economy.

—Economic and social norms of practice and others will be made in measure than to existing industrial units and existing industrial structures.

—As of 1 April 1991, assets allocated for sale for the privatization of economic enterprises with state capital (over 11 May 1990).

—Some 14 thousand enterprises with state capital are being prepared for privatization with the participation of several firms from abroad. A presentation will be made at May regarding the sale of 1000 of these enterprises.

—As of the second half of May, operating conditions will be established in about 1.5 million (from 1 through 3,000 administrative centers).

—At a cost of 2,000,000 rubles, housing units built with state funds—841,000 (46 percent) have already been sold and 504,000 are in the process of being resolved.

—Work continues on the draft bill regarding a legal settlement of the situation of the 250,000 housing units which entered the state financing and the threat of nationalization, cancellation etc.

—The consolidation of the rates of exchange of the lei (as of 1 November 1991) and the speed of the effect of that consolidation throughout the national period is directly connected the national price system in external financial prices.

—Eighty-three percent of the consumer goods production and services and 89 percent of the output of intermediate products for investment and export are being sold at balanced prices between demand and supply.

—However, attention continued to be given to the fact that the prices failed to balance between the demand and supply for 17 percent of the consumer goods and services and for coal and other energies.

—While a free distribution of products was maintained in the domestic market, the foreign trade continued to be liberalized by reducing the number of products subject to contingencies or temporary banned for export.

—As of 1 January 1991, a new customs tariff was introduced, adapted to the new situation.

—The Export-Import Bank will encourage exports, especially of equipment, installations, and complex processing, by granting low-interest loans and guaranteeing export loans.

—On the basis of discussions between the government and trade unions, collective labor contracts were negotiated by sectors and industries at the level of autonomous management and branches, categories are also being finalized.

—As of January 1991, individual salary ranges were established and limits were established in the growth of the overall wage fund with a view to preventing an inflationary spiral.

—The economic emergence may maintain additional individual salaries by raising the productivity and taking off superfluous personnel.

—The period of payment of unemployment relief was reduced from six to nine months simultaneously a system of social assistance was recommended for those who do not qualify for unemployment payments.

—Three new funds were opened either to receive the Transport Committee and the Romanian Bank, and the Export-Import Bank, was put into operation with an initial capital of 20 billion lei.

—The commercial banks formed by the split of the National Bank have begun performing capital by issuing stock or through state contributions.

—It is believed that the gold exchange, the establishment of private property and of the state property fund, the activation of stock issues in non-financial companies and the issue of new financial instruments for financing the budget deficit will gradually be realized on the capital market.

—A value added tax will be introduced as of 1992, the draft bill for it has already been adopted by the government and is due to be submitted to Parliament.

- The draft bill on local income and other taxes, which will give increased authority to local and county councils, is already in Parliament.
 - The government, in conjunction with the National Bank, has adopted the necessary measures to continue privatizing the power sector and strengthen the financial discipline of administrative organizations and businesses by enacting unpaid bills, establishing procedures for declaring companies as bankrupts, etc.
 - After six months of consecutive drops in the industrial production, following the measures adopted on 13 November 1991 and in January and February 1992, the industrial output decline was stopped (only 1.7 percent of the minimum power imports were carried out in March, and only 2.8 percent in April); consequently, the industrial production has begun falling again, although orders are at hand.
 - In the first quarter of 1992 exports were 24.2 percent larger than in the same period of 1991.
 - On 1 July this year the number of unemployed and other jobless persons was 190,000 (4.8 percent of the country's active population), compared to 260,000 and 1.3 percent on 30 September 1991.
- For the sake of comparison, the unemployment rate in Poland is 1.7 percent, and in Czechoslovakia 1.0 percent.
- In the past six months, 237 industrial production facilities were closed down in an orderly manner: 10 mines, 17 machine-building enterprises, 41 chemical and petrochemical installations, and 46 units of the textile and leather industries.
 - In March the price index was 201.8 percent compared to September 1991 and 117.3 percent compared to October 1991.
 - The average nominal net wage index in March 1992 was 106.4 percent compared to September 1991 and 107.8 percent compared to October 1991.
 - The ratio between the wage index and price index was 0.5 (in reference to September 1991) and 0.66 (in reference to October 1991).
 - In 1991 the annual inflation rate was 123 percent and the average monthly inflation rate was 10.5 percent; in the first quarter of 1992 the average monthly inflation rate was 13.9 percent.
 - In 1991 the budget deficit was \$1.3 billion, and the deficit projected for 1992 is about \$1.7 billion (\$4 billion in imports and 1.4 billion in exports).
 - The essential measures for the continued high inflation were increased hourly wages with no account between the labor force and labor productivity developments and billions of about two months in distributing the annual commitments of the local contractors in 1991 with

the Cimos of 24, i.e., \$230 million, the latter having been of a bureaucratic nature.

- In view of the shortage of foreign currency for both consumption, the Romanian economy came to depend increasingly on foreign sources of financing. The budget deficit represents 18 percent of the exports envisaged for 1992 and 23 percent of the imports.
- Shifts existing in the lending and taking sectors of foreign financing.
- Aims and tasks are much more important objectives to gradually eliminate the foreign currency deficit which means stopping the formation of foreign debt for the daily consumption of the economy and the public.
- There is only one alternative to the above objectives. Within a few days we will have not only an economy based on centralized management, but also foreign debts.
- In accordance with the international financial rules, a country requesting foreign loans to finance a foreign currency deficit caused by daily economic and consumer consumption must on a rule prove to its creditors that a tax reduction program aimed at eliminating the disequilibrium.
- A series of government actions at this time is unacceptable because it eliminates any chance to ensure monetary stability and to renew the national economy.
- In implementing the new currency law policy, the Romanian National Bank (SNB) and the commercial banks will take the following steps. Since the restructuring measure was presented to the SNB from 75.15 percent to 50.45 percent or even 70.45 percent of the price increase ratio in March 1991 the new rule states that consumers apply different interest rates for loans given by the commercial banks, so that they should be lower for old loans (originated to finance investments with a long production cycle) and higher for new, according to individual case and in keeping with the resources of the banks in question, determined by the cost of their credit resources.
- Special attention will be given, among other things, to eliminating the system of import and export licenses, with the exception of licenses for target operations, products subject to contingencies, etc.
- One of the functions missions having a decisive impact on the people's living standard is that as the economy is becoming liberalized, individual products will have better access to their marketing.
- The prices of products and services used by the mass population (electrical power, bread, milk, eggs, oil, etc.) will be increased by 20 percent of the existing values. The protection measures will also affect to all categories of income earners, persons, employees, their total wage decreases for doctors, etc.; salaries will be increased by covering 100 percent of

The effects of the price increases, or changing with the effects of the bank's consumption rates up to next regulation.

For products and services utilized by only certain categories of the population, payments for the tariff difference on mobile or mobile lines or other other public transportation for consumers will be left to the discretion of the consumer themselves, which however is one of their choices; payments for the tariff difference for student mobile or mobile tickets or other other transportation will be borne from the budget. The price of school notebooks for students of all levels will be established without subsidies, but the price difference will be paid by the Ministry of Education and Science, whose subsidies will be further distributed from of cost costs will remain unchanged, with 75 percent of the existing subsidies will be continued for these new and more products used in social protection programs. The prices of the other new products and items will be changed following the conclusion of subsidies for most on the hand.

Bank Lends Less Development Under Control

International Banknotes, S.A./in Aradunca - M.R.C.
pp. 1-1

Unprecedented measures with National Bank Governor Mihai Dumitru on 27 April, year our great "Le Pétard in Rousse Will Be Considered New Gold Criterion".

(TBC, p.1) On the measures concerning and the modification of the foreign currency register, Dumitru as highest recognition of the fact that what was done in November was not implemented and that the living (in word given in English) was a blunder?

(Bancu) The system that has been implemented in our country since November works very well, and the in countries like Switzerland and France. The model will be November system was that, on the one hand, we acted on the basis of money with a low level of inflation, and on the other that in February we were compelled to partially break off the system. If it had continued we would have had to increase the exchange rate and take massive steps. I will say again February the right time to an interest rate rise to 100 percent and to the control of the exchange rate? Moreover, we did not know that was going to happen with foreign financing, we still did not have the agreement with the IMF and the World Bank. But even measures with the extent we went in of November implemented period of time of about six to eight months and December. The external change we now implemented—out of technological rather than purely economic considerations—is a major function of the right to any foreign currency in Romania bank.

In my opinion as an economist, if the two lines from of external and foreign equilibrium—the exchange rate and interest rates—work well and if we balance them off, meaning that we can accept the social cost and the pen-

nitizing from the members of their own union, then the foreign currency system does not matter. It can create foreign currency problems or consequences (inflation, deficit and so on). These foreign functions are doing something in their power to keep foreign currency, and when they cannot keep it in the country, the foreign currency goes abroad. That is why we came to the conclusion that we need to change the foreign currency regulations, all the functions will be able to keep foreign currency, but the regulations will be very strict in Romania payments will be made out of us, we will not allow the Romanian economy to run against the law of nature, and respects will have to bring home within a given period of time all payments received abroad, when there are any at banks in Romania regardless of whether the banks are domestic or foreign. In this manner we can prevent foreign banknotes such as we implemented last year, when the banks were keeping their foreign currency and allowing out to pay their bills. Furthermore, 10 percent of the foreign currency payments received will be paid at the exchange rate of the day, and the others will be used to pay for power users and others. This is an operation typical of a market economy. This is not a matter of decision-making or of taking over the bank and to the monetary authority of the country. This operation will be presented in detail in a foreign currency regulation that will be issued later.

(A22) What can we do for the Romanian economy to no longer depend on foreign financing?

(Bancu) We need to take measures & experts has informed that two areas of prioritizing in lack of regulation. The first is financing, either from domestic sources—for which I made measures that are measures on the basis of inflation, or with domestic financing from inflationary foreign financing, and this are in what conditions we are getting out.

The second aspect is to adjust, adjust the inflation instead of prioritizing them. The point is how to end to not depend on foreign financing, we need to decrease our adjustment effects, which are not so powerful but necessary. So we must adopt high interest rates, which contributes to the recovery of the national currency. The external currency is itself a commodity that, if it is sold under market price, under the market price, it means that we are reducing, softening the external economy and we cannot influence a currency by inflation.

(A23) How much will the lire be England?

(Bancu) Of course, I cannot tell that. You can I talk of the situations that will be to us and to others. What I can tell you is that we will keep the evaluation of the lire under control. It will not go off to a spiral. There will be 100 percent financing. Organizations like as November we will want to synchronize with the market conditions, as closely as possible to how other countries are proceeding at a low percentage, sometimes faster and sometimes more slowly. When a government in Eng-

and the main task of the committee is the banks to commercialize their foreign currencies has not been finished, we will not allow the exchange rate to move toward the real margins assumed by both the banks and themselves.

According to all our calculations, at the existing three to four weeks we can afford, i.e., pass the entire mark currency or the banks through the commercialization channel, however some of the marks are speculative. Much will depend on how as the external open will run. Many people counted on such a move. They took loans at 35-40 percent interest and waited for the dollar to come from 200 to 300 lire, and trade today is that way. These people will disappear of their own accord, we will not even have to chase them off.

[A/2] How far will the rate rise of the lire be supported?

[Borsig] The easiest way is to ban foreign currency reserves. However, currency reserves and internationalization is means of monetary reserves is important in financing financing by previous accumulation of foreign financing. We are not well off in that area, and therefore the exchange rate will be supported rather by means of monetary reserves and commercial policies such as making the lire more expensive, raising interest rates and discouraging noncommercial imports by introducing import surcharges.

[A/2] What is the current foreign situation?

[Borsig] We have material regarding stockpiles that we will present to Parliament. But we do have some significant figures. One of them has very serious implications. 23.4 percent of Romania's GNP without one-quarter of what is produced in the country retained in stock by the end of 1981. On the one hand, that shows that instead of going to consumers, all the accumulation still taking place is made in the Romanian economy remained blocked in material stockpiles. On the other hand, this explains the fall in consumption. Strategic cannot be used either for production or for final consumption. After an initial realization, strategic are distributed equally one-third to centralized production, one-third to raw and other materials, and one-third to finished production, for which another couple of reference marks exist in order to sell it, and the reusable production. As an example I can tell you that this figure of 23.4 percent was also registered by the fact that last year it was financed at a very low interest rate.

[A/2] What are the account settlement methods that distinguish between those who pay their debts and those who do not, and those who fulfill their contracts with others?

[Borsig] The first condition is that anyone who is not paying his debts should go on normal trial. In a civilized country someone who failed to pay \$10 for one day goes to jail. Many billions of dollars are not paid and nothing happens to anyone. What chance can we have if we do

not allow the debt repayment? The debt collection system's attitude who does not pay his debts must be permanent. Last year we had more than 1,000 billion in external payments, but in the end we paid all the debts on the board. Each one expected he could not pay because of the others. This attitude must not be broken.

[A/2] At the peak of the struggle against inflation to what level do the monetarists return?

[Borsig] Not enough. Depends how far the inflation will get. If we manage to establish a surprising to plan at a 20 percent annual rate by December with a great number of 1.5 times over, or even if this figure is optimistic—as a reasonable one for a country getting out of a 10 to 15 percent annual rate inflation, a monetary reform will not be needed. To fix the dollar at 1,300 lire. Then need to have such a reform, then need to see how lire will equal 1,000 old lire, but then give up foreign, i.e., throwing up their calculations. Changing methods is rather a formal operation. That will not add strength to the external currency. If we were to make such compromise, we would have to admit that the lire is weaker than the dollar because \$1 is worth over 100 lire. The strength of a currency comes from its domestic health. A continuing monetary reform, however, is really something else and it can take care of inflation in abnormal special conditions. What is done tend to become a hyperinflation. We are not there yet, and we strongly hope not to get there.

In the changing the banknotes, we have begun the process and by the end of the year we will be ready to change all the banknotes and to pull out the worn ones. The process will begin already in May. As an estimate I think tell you that the banknotes alone make up more than of paper. Some of these problems is that we do not know how and how to destroy them. By the normal procedure it would take on 1-2 years.

[A/2] What project loans become operational?

[Borsig] Under the negotiations of the EXIMBANK and the methods established to guarantee loans, we have already arranged in this year's balance of payments approximately \$300 million for project disbursements. So there are attempts to direct our foreign financing toward investments, not only toward direct consumption. Until now these obstacles prevented us from following that direction. The absence of currency reserves, the creation of a system of guarantees that took time, and a shortage of creditable projects. An application of a couple of guarantees are not enough for a foreign creditor to consider as a creditable project. You need thoroughly justified projects, and we did not have many of these. The plans must persuade that we know how to work and that we have made all the calculations.

[A/2] Is there any chance of securing the external foreign currency to buy agricultural treatment substances and fertilizers in time?

AFID-433-43-40
1 June 1962

ROMANIA

40

(Secret) As of this very afternoon (21 April 1962)—and since the currency market will be unaffected. Which does not necessarily mean that the exchange rate will go in one theory way, no one needs to panic. In view of the

urgent need for agricultural imports, the foreign-currency accounts were attacked earlier with the approval of the government. The others, however, cannot be given priority, as spite of the heavy pressures applied.

Alleged Greek Program Against Macedonians

ALLEGED SECRET DOCUMENT TO THE SECRET SERVICE
IN MACEDONIA 27 MAY 40 pp 1-2

(Article in *Stavros* issue special for NWO & WORLD-CRISIS, "Secret Document for a Program Against Macedonians"—first paragraph in NWO & WORLD-CRISIS translation)

(Text) is a letter to Greek President Karathassis, the Society of Threatened Peoples, exposing the Greek plan for the destruction of Macedonians in Greece, reveals that the truth about Macedonians be told and that the generalized actions of the Greek secret police be stopped.

Dated 27 May 40

The German Society of Threatened Peoples in the World, with headquarters in Göttingen, which is also known for publishing the periodical POKAL/CRIS, which on several occasions has come up with extensive information on the situation of Macedonians in Greece and on the Greek policy of genocide, issued, on the eve of the meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of the European Community in Brussels, its concerns for the protection of small nations, that steps be taken to reveal the truth about Macedonians in Greece and the generalized actions taken by the Greek secret police toward Macedonians in Greece. The letter was addressed to Constantine Karathassis, president of the Republic of Greece, as follows:

Among other things, the letter contains the following: "There are between 150,000 and 300,000 Macedonians living in Greece, in our estimate. It is not a question of a small linguistic group whose basic minority rights are denied. The reason for such demands is exclusively the intolerance shown by your government toward minorities, especially by the leading New Democracy and PASOK parties. Such an incomprehensible separation campaign waged against the neighboring Republic of Macedonia should be ended and a ban imposed on constant spying on and surveillance of the Macedonian minority in northern Greece by Greek state security. A secret document, which reached us recently, reveals that the alleged 'Secret from Skopje' is a means for the destruction of the Macedonian minority in that area of Greece."

Some of the methods aimed at the destruction of the Macedonian minority are the following. Only Greek citizens whose mother tongue is Greek have the right to be employed in the southern part of Greece, whereas Macedonians can work only in the southern Greek areas. More rigorous steps are taken to prohibit the use of the Macedonian language and customs by party and youth organizations in the villages of Aegean Macedonia, whereas Greek soldiers are allowed to marry Macedonian women and thus reduce the number of Macedonians. The women are forced to deny their Macedonians. According to our information, this document indicates a violation of fundamental and basic human

rights of Macedonians since the 1949 civil war. Since then, the use of the Macedonian language has been forbidden with the help of a variety of punishments, threats, and imprisonment, not only in malediction and crime but also in the very bones of the Macedonians. Anyone who left Greece during the civil war is forbidden to return to his native place in Greece. Those who have returned as Macedonians have had all their possessions confiscated along with whatever they had carried abroad. We also know that, in the past two years, newly founded Macedonian societies have been kept under constant control by the Greek secret service, for which reason they have been unable to publish their works, and the recognition of such societies has been forbidden by the Greeks.

The letter to Karathassis was signed by Thomas Litsch, president of the Society of Threatened Peoples, in the light of the secret document, which accompanied the letter, dated 27 February 1983, entitled "Macedons against Macedonia," which shows that the Greek secret service has undertaken specific actions to eliminate everything Macedonian in northern Greece.

The efforts of the people of Skopje to gain Macedonian independence must be blocked by all possible means. The best way are to prohibit the use of the Macedonian language and for Macedonians to move to other parts of Greece and be replaced by Greeks, thus eliminating the Macedonian question.

To prohibit the return of Macedonians who had escaped and lived elsewhere so that no single Macedonian will remain in the northern part of Greece and to block any type of cultural and linguistic propaganda coming from Skopje to that part of Greece.

To set up special organizations under the supervision of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and thus block the spread of Macedonians in northern Greece.

To employ individuals who do not speak Macedonian.

To encourage those who are employed with their family separation and other state benefits.

To promote Greek cultural activities and expand them, to publish books and pamphlets to promote the concept that abroad Aegean Macedonians will be considered Greek, thus defining the word "Macedonia".

To cause various difficulties for students from Greece studying in Skopje to prevent them from pursuing their studies (different denied and so forth).

To encourage young people emigrating to promote the Greek idea and, if necessary, to persuade the people with the help of money, as well, that neither the Macedonian language nor Macedonians exist.

To immediately move to the southern part of Greece all individuals in Letta who are employed and who speak Macedonian.

YUGOSLAVIA

To give other benefits and promotions to soldiers who marry Macedonian women and make them adopt Greek customs.

To colonize the land with a view to full replacement for the Greeks and the development of high standards. Thus blocking the spread of propaganda coming from Skopje and neutralizing the Macedonians.

The document further states that all Macedonians must be kept under surveillance and subject to spying for the purpose of the definitive elimination of the Macedonians and the creation of pure Greek settlements, as

well as imposing all kinds of prohibitions on Macedonian societies, organizations, and groups demanding independence, autonomy, or minority rights.

These regulations were signed by Lieutenant General Dimitris Karakas. It is further known that the task of the Armatiki Club in Dusseldorf is to mount Greek anti-Macedonian campaign and that it is financially assisted by the Greek secret police. Furthermore, the Greek Consulate in Dusseldorf and Greek consulates elsewhere in Germany maintain a large network of Greek spies who pay attention to anything that goes on, similar to the former Soviet KGB.

**END OF
FICHE**

DATE FILMED

11 June 1992